2/4/04 Interview with Colonel Alan Scott

I.) Career Background

- 1970 - Entered Air Force
- 11 yrs in Air Ops business incl. tour of NORAD
- Flew F-106 (11 yrs)
- 1981 flew F-16's
- 1981 - Went into General Air Ops area.
- Tour of Korea
- STand-Eval. business related TO F-16
- Took his squadron TO Desert Shield
- Flew in Desert Storm I in Iraq
- Former Vice-Cmdr. of CONR
- Retired June 2000
- Came back TO CONR as DOD Civilian Contractor

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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

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— 11/29/03 — he became a Civil Servant

R — Heavy background in Operations

9:16 UAL 93 notice Tail # transponder on from 9:16 - 9:40 ↓ Did it strike him that fighters were intercepted UAL 93.

II.)

1999 — he was on active duty and Vice-Cmdr of CONR. when he participated in RAM Study.

↓

— People — Air Force believed NORAD was on a sunset mission. —

— 6/1/98 — he arrived at CONR.

↓

— Arnold gave him a copy of AF Command recommendation TO close down first AF/Norad.

— RAM Study → Is this a sunset mission or is it not?

— if not, how do we close down and re-apportion resources.

— DoD — high priority is TO defend Homeland

— Focus of U.S. Air Force in 1980's and 1990's was outside U.S. b/c Soviets were seen as less and less of a threat.

- Terrorism had not yet become a growing concern.
- 1998 - @ CONR put Osama B.L. on its cover.
- No Intel. person on RAM Team.
- Scott believed the biggest threat to U.S. was a poor man's cruise missile coming from off shore. (1)
- JBEC - can consolidate various radar data into 1 picture → can help thwart missile attack on us
- They talked about asymetric threats (e.g. ultra light planes, ~~drug~~ & light planes w/ drugs, etc.)
- Langley was stood down as an Alert Site at same time prior to 9-11.
- Why not use Andrews as an alert site instead of L.F.I?
- Scott's opinion - 1980's D.C. political mindset

was that it sends a bad public message to have armed fighters on alert in Wash. D.C

— Pre 9-11 → no Air Force exercises to protect D.C area / fly CAPS over D.C. → political climate would not allow it. —

— ~~FAA~~ D.C. was a safe haven for commerce through the air prior to 9-11., (high density ~~traffic~~ commercial)

— Scott's opinion re: threat pre 9-11 of Aircraft being used as Weapons.

— ~~4~~ (e.g. → NORAD) exercised scenario with ~~high~~ hijacked A/C loaded with chem / bio weapons).

— He says they never exercised a ~~suicide attack~~ w/ a Aircraft while he was on active duty. (Pre June 2001)

— Pre 9-11 exercises that contemplated terrorists crashing A/C into U.S. involved an escalation of events whereby

the initial intent was not to crash the A/C.

- Pre 9-11 No use of military A/C against Commercial Aircraft.
  JCCT Instruction — attachment A or Enclosure A.

III) — NORAD'S Efforts To re-Construct the Events of 9-11 with Dr. Finkelman

— Gen. Eberhart visited CONR POST 9-11 w/ reconstructed Radar tracks of 4 hijacked A/C.

— He found out recently, last 2-3 wks that NORAD did an after-Action Report re: 9-11

— NORAD may have run a 9-11 re-Construction under NORAD'S Current Posture.

— Efforts at CONR / NEADS level TO re-Construct events of 9-11.

Scott used those for May 2003 brief.

— NEADS → ① had 84th Rades Squadron perform a radar analysis
② Official NORAD timeline — released about 1 week after 9-11)

(3) NEADS slides / timeline

— He disavows title of "timeline expert" given to him by McKinley at May hrg.

Went from 14 TO 400 aircraft in 14 hrs on 9-11

— He loves Working With Power point.

(A) — He wanted TO Understand how the attacks went down.

(B) — He knew they were going TO have TO explain it.

— He does not know who at NEADS took the lead in re-Constructing events of 9-11.

— NEADS sent a fore bones brief TO Gen. Arnold / Cont. HQ.

Scott thinks he gave this report TO NORAD

— Mid / late October 2001 →
Scott prepared Power Point / Slide Briefing marked "Operation NOBLE EAGLE" "Air War Over America"

The times on this Brief came from NEADS Briefing — Given TO Gen. Arnold.

He had no reason to doubt timeline information given TO him by NEADS.

* — He understands that NORAD is revising its timeline. **

— He does not recall any post 9-11 directive from NORAD TO perform an after-action report.

* — He "never reviewed the logs." (He never reviewed the NEADS logs.)

— There was an effort TO ~~Square~~ Square NEADS Brief/timeline with the 9/18/01 NORAD timeline.

— He learned that NEADS recorded the floor after the 9-11 Commission requested its recordings.

— He never saw the ~~the~~ "Cheri Bott" Graphical 9-11 Analysis: NORAD Response"

— He had no involvement in preparation of 9/18/01 NORAD timeline.
↳ He only rec'd timeline.

— He was aware of Leslie Filson Book "Air War over America" - Released in 9/2003

— Filson book project started in approx. 9/2002.

- 1st Air Force never had a historian pre 9-11.
- He wrote Introduction of Felson book.
- He was a subject matter expert on the "Core hood" aspect of the book.
- He spent the most time on the "timeline of 9-11" at CONR.
- He had some conversations w/ Col. Marr re: timeline of 9-11.
- He did not review CONR chat logs prior to May Commission hearing.

Review of Col. Scott's May 2003 testimony

- He says he may have pulled certain times on the timeline TO the Commission from the Internet.
- He did not seek info from FAA itself for 5/03 timeline. → He may have referenced FAA Web sites.

— Gen. McKinley asked him to give timeline briefing 48 hrs before 5/03 hrg.

— 8:20 AM. — Scott says AAL 11 transponder off ~~special channel~~ and he "gleaned this from FAA Response."

— Gen McKinley felt like the Scott briefing "answered the mail".

— He gave the Noble Eagle briefing dozens of times pre 5/03.

— He says at 9:09 A.M. all CONR alert sites (7) went to battle stations.

— middle of October 2001 → he received NEADS Briefing from NEADS.

Col. Scott

- 1970 ent.
- N. HQ tour / 11 yrs Air Def.

Operations
- F-106 / F-16 (81)
- Korea
- F-16 Commander / 1st Corps / Def. Shield
- Prof Air War College

Doctrine
- Vice Cmd. AF Doctrine Center
→ last 2 yrs Tyndall (PC Maneuver)

Dir. of Ops June 1998
Vice Comm. 1st AF - RAM Team
Retired June 2000
next week DoD consultant / Gen. A.

9/11 → DoD contractor
Nov 29, 2003 → Civil Service Job.

"Special Projects" for Gen. A.
- OPS, Doctrine

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o Arch. + Comm links

- 99 1st Package AF Comm plan to close 1 AF
↳ Gen A not consulted about it

☆ ○ Intel on RAM? not really
Analyt. efforts — CM, LR Bombers

Extended { "Defend Homeland highest priority for DOD"

-UBL on slide in 1998

VO
Falcon Virgo

"Most like threat = poor man's cruise missile carry offshore"

☆ - other Asymm.
· Ultra lights / General Aviation
· UAV

• CPX → LOE
GAurnt in CONUS exercises
↳ ID shortfalls in Detecting (FAA coord)

* Langley site had to be fought for
~~CJCS~~ JCC Instruction: 36101?
Attachment/Enclosure A
↳ no use of mil. A/L against CONUS!

- "Resource Starved Mission" > ↑ tech. to see / FAA
  "Struggling to stay alive"

Reconstruction

- NORAD Exhibit visit ~~few weeks post-9/11~~ post.
  - complete reconstruction of the flights w/ recon.

- "Navy AAR recently done"
  ↳ HQ did not see in last few months 9/11 reconstruction w/ our current posture

- W/in the month following 9/11
  - ~~NEADS~~ Used 2 sources
    ① RADES (84th)
    ② Official NORAD timeline (major events)
    ③ NEADS slides / timeline
    ↳ "bare bones" brief that was sent to HQ
    HQ sent it to NEADS.
    ↳ we have this. Radar slides.

- Timelines on 1st Scott brief came from the orig. NEADS briefing.
  - Orig. going to selective Mil.
    ↳ DV visits

- OP tempo prevented normal AAR process
  ↳ usually 30 day hotwash

✡ Qualitative Assessments included w/
* positive comments, opinions of Scotty.

* - I may rewind the logs.

• Sept 18th Press Release + NEMDS only
bicf.

- Knew of types / Dist. system
↳

- AWOA
Sept 03
↳ ~~[illegible]~~ 1 yr in works

- SS big thinker of AWOA
- worked alot w/ Maj. Arias.

~~-909~~

~~-925~~

☒ Why not include the 0843 notification of IJ

☒ Why switch 0924 L. sound on 93 (1ST)
↓
"I transferred the #1 Brief directly to the May theme" L sound. on 77 (May)
+
test.

☒ 0924 Scott Statement disconc.
puts impression that 77 = Lagle Sc

☒ 0916 FAA notify. on loss of 93
↳ NO Squawk?
Arnold statements that lunch was on 93!

"Used Internet, reputable websites"
"considered NORAD to have best, latest info"

✗ Phone moved to May 23 hearing
Gen. Mck asked

When dist SS get NEEDS brief + timeline

dont recall

↳ ... 2-3 wks after early Oct. / middle Oct.

① Intell

② Exercises

Chief of Ex.
Lt Col.

LIVE — SIM
maj

Del Two
- Dep Dir. Intell
- Nat. Ques
- Strat. Analyst

Millovich
Chief of Live Exercises
↳ Dir. of Ops Exec.
WADS → 96-
• Air Battle Manager
WADS on 9/11
↳ WD
SD grad.

- Scenarios written & Named
  ↳
- from objectives → drive scenarios

Analysis = NORAD
Virgo = Live fly

AV = annual event pre-9/11

- pre 9/11 Intel Shop & Corps
  ↳ = 6 people ops
  NOT Analysts, "we were current Intel. Briefers."

if not in a finished product we didn't get it or create it
↳ Consumer

Scott 2/4

10:07:24 Battle reporting a/c over the WTI

1970 → 1981 11th AD and NORAD Tour
→ visiting F16 – GPurpose – Korea – HQ TAC
→ operation JUST CAUSE
→ 4 DS/DS
→ war College
→ Tyndall
→ Professor AWC
→ Af Doctrine Center
→ last 2 years
DO 1AFF
June
VCO June 00
retired

DoD Contractor with NOV 29 2002
→ Carl Vinson

JUN 00
↓
NOV 02

① Transcripts? AP INC

Jun 1 1998 Package to close 1FF
Gen Arnold put together a neutral team [RAM]
Is museum a armed museum?
If so how do we divest?

"Home game" "Away game"
ergo "French Foreign Legion" mentality

Pat BBL on briefing slides in 1998
Hart Rudman Commission
RAM teams reassigned. WTC I
• Sarin Tokyo
• OKC
doesn't recall detailed member on RAM
or an actual insert
"asymmetric". was biggest threat
most likely threat, poor man's
cruise missile from offshore

asymmetric
• light plane Mexico to Chicago
• advent of GPS

Exercises
intended to exercise levels of POE

High-Low-High Fighter Profile
Gap in S cal
" " Mexico border
General Arnold didn't like the 7 sites
Langley wasn't on initial list of 7
Q is, what was

opinion 80's thought of armed a/c in DC
was untenable
Spoke to philosophy of
"air commerce" & DC CAP

Exercise Scenarios

Sim →

Never exercised suicide a/c while he was AD

Not a point event issue, focus on macro level, political

Default was NORAD timeline

NORAD Reconstruction

A few weeks after
Gen Eberhart brought a briefing team
Dr Finkleman early 2002

NEADS level
They did one of two
- 84th RADES analysis
- OFFICIAL NORAD TIMELINE
PUBLIC AFFAIRS [redacted]

(*) NORAD ~~Dr~~ Revising timeline
He accepted dates as
given to him by NEAD
Sector

Scott

~~0909~~

~~0924~~

- 0916 "FAA reports poss HJ UA93" UA 175 / ?
  1. To whom?
  2. Where does this come from? "~~mil~~ tail # N612UA/75 208/"

- 0924 "FAA reports possible HJ AA77" AA11
  1. True, to whom?
  2. Source? "American Airlines # N334AA hijacked

- 0924 "Langley F-16's scrambled on AA77"
  * in testimony is immed. juxt. to FAA notice of poss HJ 77.
  * Leaves <u>False Impression</u>

- 0925 "AA77 reported headed toward D.C"
  1. Source? mcclt "Hijack AA FLT headed to Wash D.C."
  2. to whom?
  * cover chat log says it is AA11 headed tow. D.C.

- 0927 "Boston FAA reports 5th a/c missing (Delta 89
  1. Source? ~~boston tapes?~~ - MCCIT log
  2. we see 1st NEADS phone report on D1989 as 0941
  * In fact, 5th unk. is @ abt 1000 + event. det. to be a Canadian a/c

- 0934 "FAA unable to locate AA77" - matrix
  "..., trough chat, ..."
  1. which Chat? Accurate?
  also in MCCIT @ 0934 (.334)

was a 9:32 call from ZDC to ID section (Cl.4 watch) Skelly

- 0941 "FAA reports D1989 poss HJ"

* yes, totally accurate / ± / only ~~achieved by reviewing the tapes~~?

1. Is this in ANY log? Yes, mcc/t (1341)

- 0945 "B089 Forward told" → mcc/t log

- 0947 "Delta 89 lands in Cleveland" - matrix

"Delta89 will land in Cleveland (possible)"

" 9:47 is when Delta 1989 clears the system by landing in cleveland. So he's not a hijack." - testimony

1. Did you review log?
2. When does 1989 land? ~~10:00~~ 10:11
3. Did you review radar data re 1989?

- 1007 "FAA reports bomb onboard UA 93"

* yes, totally accurate

~~1. only achieved by reviewing the tapes?~~

2. ~~Is~~ This in ANY log? Yes MCC/T

3. Do/did you see in conversations mined. ~~1015~~ following this (same time) what flight is unable to find UA 93?

* pg. 37 bottom

- 1015 "UA 93 reported crashed"

* yes, totally accurate

~~1. In any log? Yes~~ MCC/T

- Mr. Hamilton's L. Of Q. on why they didn't put into their timeline the Pres./VP Authority to shoot down a comm a/c.

Ldr: "Why would that not be in your timeline?"
Gen A: "I don't know when that happened."

* Chat Log Time 10:31

* Not in MCC/T Log

☆ Scott knows frm. 1. MCC of Ch 2
2. Chat log(s)
- conf DCO chat 10:31

☐ - L. of Q. on SSgt James D Tollack