10/27/03 Colonel Robert man Briefing

Neads mission: Provides air sovereignty

- On 9/11/01 - 2 alert Bases (Otis and Langley) under NEADS Control.

- NEADS Missions:

(1) → (1) Hijack - aiding civil authorities re: safety of flight - 1992 - 737 hijacked out of Europe (Lufthansa).

- Concern for NEADS → safety of flight was the main mission for NEADS.

NEADS called FAA: → It took 6 hrs for NEADS to coordinate the ~~NEAD~~ Lufthansa Intercept with FAA.

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(2) Counterdrug

(3) Air Sovereignty

(4) Search and Rescue:
- A.) 84 Radar
- B.) Kennedy Aircraft
- C.) Egypt Air 990
- D.) ~~TWA~~ TWA 800
- E.) Lost Caribou
- F.) Beaver Island
- G.) New Hampshire

(5) "Homeland Defense"

(6) Aerospace monitor / Control

- Needs has a telephone line TO Langley Search and Rescue Squad, ↓ relies on Needs TO get the reliable 84TH radar data for plane location.

- Needs has the capability to cover the WADS and SEADS area if necessary.

- Joint Surveillance System
  - ↳ 14 Radar Sites pre 9-11

→ Radar site "North Truro" went down on 9/11/01 for preventative maintenance.

9/11 – NEADS → does not have a unique radar system. → all NEADS radars are fed by FAA radar sites.

– Today – NEADS has 19 radar scopes (17 on ops floor, 1 in Battle Cell and 1 in maintenance).

– Front row of ops floor are Weapons guys who control fighter planes.

– ID people → have 2 to 5 minutes to identify suspicious A/C. (2 to 5 minute standard to identify target established by NORAD).

– ID people have scopes.

– SOCC Sector operations Control Center

– NCRCC – natl. Capital Region Coordination & Control Center. (Created after 9/11/01).

TSA Created the NCRCC.

— NCRCC is not a Command Center.

— Col. Mann says he launched Langley to help cap NYC on 9/11.

— Col. ~~Man~~ Mann ~~Ba~~ says 84th Rades should be able to tell us if OTIS planes (Duff & Nasty) went supersonic on 9/11.

— Pre 9-11 hijack exercise →
— used real aircraft
— no Warning given to controllers at NEADS
— Atlantic City scrambled.
— 'E A.C. Aircraft were directed inland among FAA traffic
~~— It took 20 minutes to get scramble order.~~
— Lessons learned → It was easier to scramble fighters over W105 first and then turn them around

and direct them to inland target.

— 9:40 A.M. → UAL 93 transponder off.

— Marr now says he scrambled Langley first on N.Y. and then immediately thereafter changed to D.C. area b/c he feared UAL 93 would turn around and head for a ~~to~~ target in Wash. D.C.

Q: When did UAL 93 lose radio contact.

Q: When did FAA report UAL 93 as hijack or a Bomb on board?

— Marr outline says FAA reported UAL 93 at 9:16 A.M.

— B/W 9:40 A.M. and 9:45 A.M. → General Arnold (CONR) told Marr he could secure authority ~~to~~ for Marr to "take lives in the air to save lives on the ground" = i.e.

Authority TO shoot down Commercial airliners.

- FAA liaison TO NEADS on 9/11 → Steve ~~Cob~~ Culbertson..

1/23/04 Interview Colonel ROBERT MARR

- Col. FRed DAVIES
- G. BROWN
- M. KARA
- K. SHAEFFER
- J. FARMER
- Col. MARR

- Career in military

- USAF Academy — 1975

- Pilot training — A2

- 1st assignment instructor Pilot T-38 — advanced trainer

- Langley AFB — T-33 assigned to 48th Fighter interceptor Squadron (1 yr.)

1982-1985 — GRIFFISS — he flew F-106 (3 yrs.)
Positions: ① Flt Commander ② Director of Standardization and Evaluation

1985-1988
next — OKANAWA — 67th Fighter Squadron

ADO in Okinawa

- Selected as major → went to Canadian School (military) 1 yr.

- Exchange tour on Canadian Staff in Canada — (Part of NORAD) ↳ 200 miles N of Toronto

- Position — SOEX — Staff Officer for Exercises

- Position — Stand — Eval. program

- Flew the T-33's

- Flew F-18's — (back seat)

- to see how the Canadians run their part of NORAD mission.

- 1989-91 — Gulf War.

↳ NORAD — still protecting for Capability (Soviet Bombers) rather than Intent.

- 1989-91 > a lot of ANG people were called to Desert Storm.
- 1991 – Came back to Griffiss to NEADS
- Promoted to Lt. Col
- Went to all of NEADS Wings to help them prepare for "ORI's."
- Riyadh, Saudi Arabia – assignment
- Hired by Phoenix Air — Civilian contractor. Checked out as a Captain in the Lear 35 and Lear 36. (20 months)
- 1996 – Director of Exercises and Analysis (DOX) Position opened and Colonel Scott hired him to fill it.
- Build exercises from the ground up.
- Role of Intelligence in

Constructing the Exercises?
↓
Intel. will affect it somewhat.
(See Tape for explanation).

- August 1999 - Promoted TO Commander of NEADS.
- #'s of Alert Bases when he started at NORAD = Approx. 14
- 9/11/01 → NORAD had 7 Alert sites.
- NEADS had 2 Alert Sites: Langley and OTIS → lowest # of Alert sites for NEADS in his career.
- Changes in Norad mission over the years? →
- Early 1990's → NORAD was considered a Peacetime Operation.
  - ↳ They focused on Peacetime Events at the beginning of Issues.

- Drug interdiction was part of its mission (has been part of its mission ~~for~~ always and inherently).

- Intercept any Unknown Tracks of Interest.

- SOP for drug interdiction? (e.g. Intell passed that suspect A/C approaching borders from South America).

- Coordination with FAA TO locate planes in connection with drug interdiction missions.

- NEADS keeps regular contact w/ FAA Centers when trying TO I.D. Aircraft approaching the ADIZ

Were there any drug interdiction missions that involved purely domestic flights? → If so, there were not too many.

- no training scenarios involving

"shooting down" Civilian or Commercial Aircraft.

- Hyack Training / Exercises:
  - Real World Event — 1993 Luftansa Hyacking.
  - NEADS Commander heard about A/C being hyacked in Europe so they had a lot of time to react to it.
- He talked to people at FAA Center Level.
- He got call from WH Crisis Action team, → they said they (WH) did not need his assistance. — then, the WH person called back and said we do need your assistance.
- Exercises to Protect NCR?
  ↳ "not Specifically"
  ↳

NEADS (1) Primary Job: Identify A/C Crossing the ADIZ.

— (2) Friendly by Origin Issue: military has restrictions if an A/C Crossed ADIZ, went out and came back on.

(3) Anything outside of above Jobs would have been aid to Civilian Authorities.

— Radars were focused on the perimeters of the Country.

— The Day of 9/11

— Battle Staff Coordinator sits to the right of BC position.

↳ Someone probably sat in this position but he can not recall who it was.

- LT. Col. Coupes => DO
- LT. Col Daniels = FO
- BC -> communicating with CONR and N.Y. State on 9/11/01
- Marr -> first call TO CONR was TO General Arnold on 9/11.
- Marr -> very Unusual TO Communicate with CMOC/NORAD in general.
- On 9/11/01 -> he does not recall any Communications directly with CMOC/NORAD On 9/11/01.

Day of 9/11/01

- 8:00 - 8:20 A.M. Exercise briefing

~~8:20~~

- He noticed people huddled by front row - WD section

- He first thought it was part of the exercise.
- Deskins reports to Battle Cab. possible hijack reported by FAA.
- Man called Gen. Arnold and asked for authority to scramble OTIS TO W 105 in response to hijack reports
- Gen. Arnold said to scramble the fighters and he'll get the authority.