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REPORT TO THE

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

ON

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES RELATING TO

THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP (14 April through 14 October 1962)

BY THE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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I. PREFACE

1. The Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board requested the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare this report on 14 November 1962. To assist him in preparing his report, the DCI appointed a committee with himself as chairman consisting of the State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

2. The DCI appointed the Inspector General of CIA as chairman of an interagency working group to conduct the review and draft the report. Members of the working group were: the Director of the Coordination Staff of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; a representative of the Office of Estimates, DIA; the Chief of the DIA's Current Intelligence Indications Center; the Deputy Chief of the Policy Division, NSA; CIA's Deputy Assistant Director for Central Reference; and the Executive Officer of Task Force W, CIA.

3. The working group drafted the report on the basis of contributions provided by member agencies of the United States Intelligence Board in response to a questionnaire circulated by the working group.

4. The report depicts the activities of the intelligence community with respect to the Cuban developments from 14 April 1962 through 14 October 1962, the day that offensive missiles were first photographed in Cuba. It also summarizes the community's actions from the latter date through 22 October 1962, the day of the President's address to the nation on Cuba.

5. It discusses the collection requirements on Cuba which were in existence before the period began and the ways in which they were subsequently expanded and augmented.

6. It describes the sources of information available to the community and the means used to exploit them.

7. It chronicles the receipt of information on the arming of Cuba, its distribution, and the ways in which that information was used.

8. Finally, it presents conclusions concerning the manner in which the intelligence community detected, watched, and reported the first Soviet attempt to place offensive weapons in the Western Hemisphere.

9. Unless otherwise noted, all dates in the report refer to 1962.

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II. INTRODUCTION

1. Information available today permits a tentative and retrospective reconstruction of the principal steps in the arms build-up. Between midsummer and fall of 1962 the Soviets attempted, within a very short period of time, to convert Cuba into a powerful strategic base.

2. These events were occurring in the environment of Castro's police-state controls, reinforced by the Soviets' own security precautions, making their detection and reporting difficult.

3. The attached table (Tab A) shows the phasing and probable time sequence of the arms build-up. The map (Tab B) shows the probable location of offensive and defensive missile sites and armored units as of mid-October 1962. The chart (Tab C) portrays the sequence of events, both as noted at the time and as learned in retrospect, of the receipt of significant information by the community, and of actions taken to get more information.

III. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. In late 1961 the U.S. Government made a decision to try to find means to create in Cuba a new situation more beneficial to the Cuban people and to U.S. interests. To provide the basis for future policy, the intelligence community was instructed to increase its intelligence and action capabilities. Between January and March 1962 various actions were taken along these lines. Among them were the following:

a. The CIA forecast for monthly overflights of Cuba was raised from one to two overflights per month.

b. A plan was developed to systematize and regularize the intelligence exploitation of refugee sources by the creation of a debriefing center in the Miami area.

c. In an effort to capitalize on community assets world-wide, plans were developed and action undertaken:

(1) to increase the number of agents inside Cuba,

(2) to make more effective use of legal travellers to Cuba,

(3) to enlist the assistance of third-country intelligence and security services,

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(4) to increase the number of penetrations, including audio surveillance, of Cuban installations abroad,

(5) to increase the number of non-resident agents outside Cuba reporting on Cuba and supporting operations against Cuba mounted from abroad,

(6) to engage in increased induced defection operations against Cubans,

(7) to recruit agents among officers and crews of Cuban and neutral vessels,

(8) to infiltrate into Cuba selected illegal teams with a dual purpose of engaging in organizing intelligence networks and developing resistance potential in Cuba.

2. These actions, which had been given impetus by the late 1961 decision to concentrate additional effort on the Cuban problem, were begun prior to any indication of a massive Soviet arms build-up in Cuba and were not related to it.

3. The period from the end of January to the middle of March, when the above actions were getting under way, was too short a time for any significant increase to be noted in the collection and processing of more meaningful intelligence on Cuba. This fact was noted in the

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National Intelligence Estimate 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," of 21 March 1962, which clearly pointed out serious intelligence deficiencies with regard to Castro's relations with the Communists, popular attitudes toward the Castro regime, and capabilities of the internal resistance movement.

4. Reviewing the estimators' preliminary findings on 14 March, a special group appointed by the President directed a continued intensification of intelligence collection activities against Cuba in order to fill these gaps so that consideration of possible U.S. action could be more appropriately made at the policy level. It was anticipated at that time that by the end of July there would be a marked increase in intelligence collection based upon the actions which had been started in January and which now were being intensified in March.

5. While these actions had been started prior to the start of the Soviet build-up, it was this series of actions which placed the community in a position of readiness when the Soviet build-up began in late July and early August.

6. To assist the Caribbean Admissions Center (CAC), (see Section IV, para. 9), which the community had established in mid-March at Opa-Locka Naval Air Station, near Miami, to screen and interview the refugees coming to Florida from Cuba, CIA prepared

the first edition of the "Interrogation Guide: Cuba". It was also sent to intelligence officers throughout the world to assist them in exploiting the knowledge of persons coming from Cuba or to brief those going to Cuba from other countries. In May the community produced a third and expanded edition of this guide for the use of CAC and the community in general, including a section on guided missiles. It is appended as ANNEX A.

7. By 14 April there were a number of lists of priority requirements on Cuba, which had been coordinated by appropriate USIB committees such as the Interagency Priority Clandestine Collection Committee and the COMINT Committee. Each agency had prepared requirements for its own collectors. Included among the listed information needs were:

a. Bloc economic and military support.

b. Bloc arms and equipment deliveries (particularly guided missiles, aircraft, and heavy armament).

c. Presence of Bloc personnel.

d. Training of Cubans in the Bloc.

e. Internal developments.

f. Economic programs.

g. Dissidence.

h. Cuban international activities and subversion in Latin America.

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8. Member agencies expanded and refined these general requirements to conform to their collection capabilities, as then existing or as later improved to respond to developments. They also levied requirements on each other in support of their own departmental tasks. Requirements were generated by production analysts who noted gaps in information holdings on Cuba or who noted leads toward acquiring further information. Or they resulted from requests for intelligence from higher staff echelons and the combat forces.

9. The COMINT Requirements List had been issued in November 1960. It was elaborated throughout the period under review by specific requests to the National Security Agency by other member agencies. The ELINT Requirements List was updated and reissued in June 1962.

10. Community requirements generation and coordination with respect to overhead reconnaissance came into focus in the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) which used individual requirements from the community to prepare a Master Target List.

11. The broad framework of requirements on Cuba which was in the community's possession before the build-up was comprehensive enough to include guidance for the gathering of

information on missiles, though this was only one of a long catalog of subjects on which information was desired. This framework was sufficient to provide guidance for the collection of information on the scope and pace of the Soviet arms build-up.

IV. SOURCES AND COLLECTION FACILITIES

1. The collection facilities used to respond to the community's requirements on Cuba ranged from human observers to the most modern technical devices. A partial list of these resources follows: controlled clandestine agents in Cuba; agents with access to Castro Cubans in other countries; agents on ships calling at Cuban ports; refugees from Cuba; [redacted] intelligence, and military officers in Cuba, in the U.S., or in other countries; travelers to and from Cuba; photography of ships bound for Cuba; Cuban diplomats abroad; [redacted] in third countries; intercept of communications and electronic emissions (SIGINT); the overt press, radio and television; overhead and peripheral reconnaissance.

2. Each of these resources contributed to the intelligence mosaic. For example, shipping intelligence alerted the community to the diversion of Soviet shipping to Cuba not long after the ships left their home ports in the Baltic or Black Seas. Agent and refugee reports raised the possibility of, first, the missile defense of Cuba, and, later, the deployment of MRBM's, and helped lead to to the employment of the overhead reconnaissance facility's unique

capability for verification of this information. Legal travelers to Cuba were of little value in providing information on the arms build-up.

3. A major and sustained effort by CIA and Army was made, before and during this period, to place and maintain clandestine agents in Cuba. These agents varied in quality from untrained informants, recruited in place, to well-trained qualified observers. The degree of control exercised over them, their access to valuable information, and their ability to observe and report it varied greatly. Security measures prevented the agents from getting near the missile sites. The arms were carried in Soviet ships, which were unloaded by Soviet personnel. The arms were then transported in Soviet-manned truck convoys to sites from which Cubans were excluded.

4. All of the problems of espionage in a denied area were present in Cuba. For a Cuban to be seen with an American meant contamination in the eyes of Cuban security. Moreover, of the one thousand-odd American citizens remaining in Cuba, many were minors or retired. Others were either Communists themselves,

or were too circumscribed by conditions to be able to assist. These factors effectively ruled out the use of American citizens as agents.

5. Resident agents were concentrated in the more densely populated areas where they would be less conspicuous. Cuban police-state controls made travel in the island difficult and risky and regular contact with the Castro authorities unavoidable. Resident agents in Cuba had to contend with the 100,000 ward-block informants, who controlled the issuance and renewal of ration books and work permits.

6. To obtain information on areas remote from the capital it was necessary to infiltrate special teams to supplement the resident agents.

7. Agents existed and worked in peril of their lives. Their communication with American case officers on the mainland was difficult and dangerous. It relied on brief messages in secret writing sent through the open mail, on quick and furtive radio transmissions, and on meetings with clandestine couriers. Some agents were killed by Castro authorities after capture or while

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resisting it; others are missing. But a number were still active and productive at the end of the period.

8. Among these agents were the men who alerted the community to the existence of the restricted military area in western Cuba where the first MRBM's were later found. Among them, too, were those who successfully scouted the SAM sites and cruise missile sites in eastern Cuba.

9. The clandestine agent contribution was supplemented and reinforced by that of refugees. Equipped with the "Interrogation Guide: Cuba," (see Section III, para. 6) U.S. intelligence officers throughout the world were ready to exploit the knowledge of persons coming from Cuba or to brief those traveling to Cuba. Most refugees went to Florida, and in March 1962 the community set up the Caribbean Admission Center (CAC) at Opa-Locka Naval Air Station, near Miami, to screen and interview them seven days a week.

10. The CAC, a joint CIA-Defense effort with CIA as the executive agent, operated under the cover of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and had a staff of 40 officers--25 military personnel from the Department of Defense (10 Army, 7 Navy, and

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8 Air Force) and 15 from CIA, all trained interrogators with the necessary language and area knowledge.

11. The refugees flowed in at the rate of about 1,700 a week. Some 75 per cent were women and children. A screening process was established to select adult males with worthwhile information to impart. There were 11,973 interviews during the period, and 4,720 reports and intelligence documents were produced. Separate refugee interrogation facilities were established by CIA in other countries, notably in [redacted] and Mexico.

12. In late August, when it became known that the Soviets were supplying the Cubans with large quantities of sophisticated military equipment of as yet undetermined nature, the Opa-Locka interrogators were given detailed guidance for seeking information from the refugees about the arms build-up.

13. The product was massive and uneven in quality, but from it came timely information on the arms build-up which was used in conjunction with agent reports to target areas for U-2 search and some of which was thus verified.

14. The Navy's interrogation of Cuban employees reporting daily for work at Guantanamo Naval Base produced useful information on eastern Cuba.

15. Foreign diplomats in Cuba supplied information and clandestine support, both with and without the knowledge of their governments, and diplomatic personnel in the U.S. and other countries were valuable sources of information on Cuba. Formal liaison arrangements with European and Latin American intelligence organizations, both military and civilian, were exploited on the Cuban problem.

16. Photographic coverage of Soviet ships going to Cuba, from shore, from the water, or from the air, was greatly expanded after the arms influx was detected, as were other facilities for collecting shipping information, such as SIGINT and clandestine maritime collection operations. The photographic coverage took place in the European narrows and in the sea lanes leading to Cuba.

17. Delivery of photographs of ships at sea was slow until late in the arms build-up. Moreover, with the exception of deck-loaded cargoes of crated MIG-21's and IL-28's, it was not productive, because the Soviets followed the practice of carrying cargoes below decks with hatches closed. The MRBM's and IRBM's were carried in the holds of ships with 70-foot hatches.

18. The SIGINT effort on Cuba had been steadily increased since early 1960, and by 14 April 1962 a sizeable collection effort already was in being. On 8 June, NSA asked the Defense Department for authority to create additional resources for the Cuban effort.

19. Cuban intercept, with bases on land, on sea, and in the air, increased from two positions in April 1960, to 13 in April 1961, to 35 in April 1962, and to 60 by 14 October 1962. With centralized control of U.S. SIGINT resources vested in the Director, NSA, the deployment and tasking of those resources were accomplished through routine management control procedures established years before the Cuban arms build-up began.

20. [redacted] by 14 April 1962. The USS OXFORD was put on station off Havana in May 1962, airborne collection platforms were diverted to the periphery of Cuba beginning in June 1961 and the airborne collection program was increased in June 1962, and mission assignments were adjusted at thirteen other collection sites throughout the world, all as part of the normal actions taken by the Director, NSA, in the discharge of his responsibilities for coordinating the SIGINT effort of the United States.

21. The Foreign Broadcast Information Division (FBID) and the Foreign Documents Division (FDD) increased their coverage of Cuban and Cuban-related overt communications media in response to requirements levied by community members. A special community requirement was fulfilled to ensure a steady and timely supply of Cuban newspapers and periodicals for the use of analysts.

22. The community's overhead reconnaissance and photographic interpretation facilities made a unique and indispensable contribution.

23. The greatest gap in coverage concerned information on Soviet intentions and on Cuban compliance therewith. There were no reporting sources within the Soviet Union which provided a specific hint as to Soviet intentions, and none of those sources who were close to Cuban leaders furnished anything specific on their decisions and actions with regard to the Soviet build-up.

24. However, the community's extensive knowledge of Soviet order of battle and of the nature and appearance of Soviet weaponry was of great value in interpreting the raw information reports on the arms build-up.

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V. REPORTING ON THE BUILD-UP

1. During 1961 and early 1962 there were numerous reports from ground observers about missile activity in 22 areas of Cuba. The intelligence community, through its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), requested the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to confirm or disprove these reports. In publications issued in December 1961 and in February and March 1962, NPIC stated that there was no photographic evidence of missile activity in any of the suspect areas.

2. Until August 1962 NPIC disproved almost all ground observer reports that Soviet missiles or excessive numbers of Soviet aircraft or submarines had been deployed to Cuba. The few others could be neither disproved nor confirmed by photography. Also during this period the findings of NPIC concerning the existence in Cuba of conventional Soviet weaponry--such as tanks, artillery and aircraft--were entirely consistent with other information available on arms shipments through the first half of 1962.

3. The reporting of all types of information on Cuba from the sources that have been described was massive, and it grew as collection facilities were increasingly focussed on the arms build-up.

4. For example, from April through September there were over 1,000 reports from CIA and Army clandestine sources with access to Cuban information. This reporting volume from clandestine operations was small compared with the total volume from all sources. SIGINT sources alone provided more than 5,700 items of Cuban information during the six months before 14 October, and the refugee center at Opa-Locka produced more than 4,700 reports or compilations.

5. Beginning in August an increasingly large fraction of this total reported the secret arms influx and attendant activities. Of this fraction, a smaller, but an even more rapidly increasing portion referred to the introduction of defensive missiles. It was not until shortly after mid-September that a few ground observer reports began coming in, which were specifically descriptive or suggestive of the introduction into Cuba of Soviet offensive weapons (see para. 15 below).

6. Reports received and analyzed through the third week of August described the arrival, during a brief time span, of several thousand Bloc personnel and of an unusually large number of Bloc ships carrying military cargoes. The reports further described the security precautions observed in the unloading of these cargoes

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and in their transportation to construction sites, from which Cuban residents had been evacuated. They indicated to the community that the speed and magnitude of this influx of Bloc personnel and equipment into a non-Bloc country was unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities.

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7. Furthermore, there was an increasing volume of reports from all sources relating to other phases of the Soviet military program in Cuba: deliveries of conventional aircraft and other military gear, electronic devices, vehicles, and construction materials; Soviet transport convoys; Soviet encampments and personnel, including an imported labor force; and military airfields and operations. The collection facilities of all USIB agencies were producing such reports at a high rate, placing an extreme burden on the analysts. In the four months ending in mid-October the over-all community reporting on Cuba increased between three and four times.

8. One factor that undoubtedly had an effect on both the intelligence effort and the policy-makers was the lobbying activities of the Cuban refugees, who were using every approach they could grab to influence the United States government to do something about liberating Cuba from Castro. Their reports ranged from eye-witness accounts to rumors and were so obviously biased that all exile refugee reporting seemed to be regarded with strong reservations.

9. Between 31 May and 5 October, NPIC published seven issues of Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba in which agent and refugee reports were evaluated in the light of available photographic evidence. Of the 138 raw reports referred to NPIC in that period, only three cited missile activity which could not be directly linked to SAM or cruise missile deployments, and NPIC's evidence disproved those three.

10. Ground observer reporting continued at an increasing rate through September and into October.

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In the 30 days ending 22 August there had been only seven agent or refugee reports about rockets or missiles, usually referred to by the Spanish term cojete, which has a wide range of meanings. In the next 30 days there were more than 40. There were as many more received between 20 September and 14 October, a few of which referred to large missiles (see para. 13 below). During this latter period there were also six reports relating to IL-28's and four relating to MIG-21's.

11. The reports of the Soviet build-up came from every province of Cuba. They varied in content appraisal and source evaluation. Many of them came from untested original sources and unskilled observers. But, allowing for inconsistencies or distortions in individual reports, the mosaic picture that emerged was remarkably consistent: (a) wide-spread and large-scale construction activity; (b) convoys of Soviet trucks, frequently moving by night and some with trailers carrying tubular objects;

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(c) new restricted military areas, from which Cuban residents had been evacuated; (d) Soviet personnel supervising the unloading of ships and the land transport of their cargoes; (e) frequent references to missiles of various types and to the construction of missile sites, and (f) evidence of almost exclusive Soviet or Bloc occupancy and control of new military sites.

12. The photography from the 29 August U-2 mission showing eight SA-2 sites (see Section X, para. 10) was the first firm evidence of what the Soviets had begun in Cuba and of how far they had then progressed.

13. From 14 April to 14 October there were over a thousand human-source reports on the arms build-up. Screening of these, even in retrospect, reveals only a handful that can be related to offensive missile activity, and only one, noted in para. 19 below, refers specifically to an offensive missile. In mid-September there was no evidence of the Soviets' intentions and no evidence of the fact that strategic missiles had already arrived in Cuba. Despite the known presence of a massive Soviet-manned SAM defense, for the intelligence analysts, conditioned to the value and importance of hard photographic evidence, strategic missiles

were still in the realm of speculation. However, several reports which began to reach the community after mid-September were suggestive enough to arouse the suspicions of analysts. The agents inside Cuba who reported this information did so by means of secret writing, which by its very nature, is slow. In the case of the refugee sources reporting this information, the delays in receiving the information resulted from the refugee not becoming available until he had left Cuba and had been processed by CAC at Opa-Locka. Some of these key reports are summarized in the following paragraphs.

14. On 15 September a resident of Havana [redacted] mailed a letter to the U.S. It contained a message in secret writing which stated that as of 7 September "a large zone in Pinar del Rio within a perimeter bounded by the cities of San Cristobal, San Diego de los Banos, Consolacion del Norte, and Las Pozas is heavily guarded by Soviets with the assistance of Peruvian and Colombian nationals. Security is enforced to prevent access to the finca (plantation) of Dr. Cortina, at La Guira, where very secret and important work is in progress, believed to be concerned with missiles." The Headquarters

recipients added map coordinates and an explanatory note on the Cortina plantation, derived from other available information, and disseminated the report on 18 September. (This was the area where U-2 photography first found MRBM's. See the fourth map in Tab D.)

15. An agent report disseminated on 20 September quoted Fidel Castro's personal pilot as having said on 9 September: "We have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface and air-to-air. . . . There are also many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets."

16. An agent report disseminated on 21 September quoted the chief of war plans of the Cuban army as having said: "We will fight to the death and perhaps we can win because we have everything including atomic weapons."

17. On 18 September a Cuban refugee [redacted] was questioned at Opa-Locka. He reported observing in Havana, on the night of 12 September, a convoy of Soviet trucks pulling long trailers carrying canvas-covered objects which looked like missiles. He drew rough sketches of the missile and tail fin silhouette. Shown a series of

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photographs by the interrogator, he identified the SHYSTER MRBM. The report was disseminated on 21 September.

18. A refugee who had been a [redacted] at Port Isabela reported having observed there, on 2 September, 20 metal cylinders, 45 to 50 feet long and about five feet in diameter, and having later seen five of them being carried toward Santa Clara on trailers. The report was disseminated on 23 September.

19. [redacted] in San Cristobal was driving home from Havana on the night of 17 September when he encountered a convoy of Soviet trucks traveling in the same direction and towing 32-foot trailers carrying huge tubes covered with canvas. Within the next few days he left Cuba and was interrogated at Opa-Locka. The report was disseminated on 1 October.

20. On 1 October the CIA station in Miami received a letter in secret writing from an agent in Havana. He reported that a sub-agent had observed "large intercontinental rockets", more than 20 meters long, being unloaded on trailers from a ship at Mariel on 19 September. The report was disseminated on 2 October with a CIA Headquarters reports officer's comment that "it is more likely that source observed SA-2 missiles being unloaded."

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21. A refugee school teacher, in a report disseminated on 2 October, added more detail about activity at the port of Mariel. In the following days reports of this type became more frequent, both from refugees and agents, but some of those cited above, together with supporting information available to the analysts, were sufficient to develop the strong suspicion that offensive missiles had been unloaded from Soviet ships and transported to a fairly definite area near San Cristobal.

22. Our limited intelligence assets within the Soviet Union did not detect the detailed planning and the extensive assembly of materials destined for Cuba. However, once the weapons were on their way, the intelligence community succeeded, in a very short period of time, in discovering and reporting the facts. Intelligence on shipping, including SIGINT, brought the first indication of the arms influx and reported on its progress throughout. SIGINT also provided a wide variety of operational leads, including clues to Soviet personalities associated with the build-up, use of Soviet techniques in Cuban air defense, and Soviet appeals for volunteers to serve in Cuba. Foreign diplomats provided significant information on the Soviet presence. Low-flying aircraft

photographed ships carrying jet bombers to Cuba. Agents and refugees provided the first indications of SAM's and later of MRBM's. U-2 photography confirmed gound observer reporting and supplied the ultimate hard evidence.

23. Throughout the period the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) produced a steady flow of photo interpretation reports in response to requests from community members. Samples are appended as ANNEX K.

24. ANNEX B contains a selection of summaries of raw information reports culled from the files of all USIB agencies on the Soviet arming of Cuba. They were chosen for their significance as it appears today, and therefore the selection is obviously based on a perspective which was not available to analysts at the times when the reports were received.

VI. DISSEMINATION OF THE REPORTS

1. Raw information reports on the Cuban arms build-up, like all such reports, were widely disseminated throughout the intelligence community. The dissemination patterns, which have been developed over a period of years, are based on a compilation of the information needs of the various components of the intelligence community.

2. Each collecting agency distributes its reports to certain "standard" addresses. In some cases, this standard distribution is a minimal one; however, in each case the basic distribution is broadly supplemented on the basis of specific requirements for particular types of information levied on each collecting agency by every customer agency.

3. Although dissemination is made according to established patterns, these patterns are highly flexible. Specific distribution requirements can be (and were) added without disrupting the disseminating mechanisms.

4. Reports that were handled through electrical channels from the point of acquisition until they reached Washington moved rapidly. Those that moved wholly or partially through non-electrical

channels were necessarily slower. Much of the delay resulted from factors over which the intelligence community had no control. Many of the reports from agents inside Cuba had to be sent out in secret writing through overt mail channels. Refugee reports could not be acquired until the refugees had managed to get out of Cuba. Certain reports received from Cuban refugee organizations were based on information from their own assets. The processing of these reports within the refugee organizations was not under the control of any element of the intelligence community. The community received the reports only when the refugee organizations saw fit to pass them to the U.S. government.

5. From early September there was a restriction on publishing intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba. This restriction did not affect the flow of raw information to analysts nor to officials who were included on the dissemination of raw reports. However, those officials who did not see raw reports and who had to rely on published intelligence could only receive this information through oral briefings or other channels. The restrictions on publication are discussed in Section VIII of this report.

6. ANNEX C describes the dissemination practices of each USIB agency engaged in foreign intelligence collection and traces the progress of sample reports from the time the information was acquired by the original source until it was received by the intelligence analyst.

VII. PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS

1. The composite of information reaching the analysts on the Cuban arms build-up was unique in peacetime intelligence operations. By the end of August the total volume of reporting reaching the analysts had become a virtual deluge. Each of the components of the intelligence community redirected its processing and analyzing mechanisms to accommodate the increased flow of reporting on Cuba.

2. The intelligence community was understandably cautious in raising any alarm over the possibility of MRBM's in Cuba. The time span was very short and the evidence was inconclusive. The MRBM's probably did not arrive in Cuba before 8 September. Because of the difficulty in getting communications out of Cuba, the first reports suggesting the presence of MRBM's in Cuba did not reach Washington until after mid-September. By 3 October, the analytical process had funneled these reports into the targeting mechanism, resulting in the 14 October U-2 flight, originally approved to activate a SAM site, being flown over an area where MRBM's might be found. (See Section X, para. 34.)

The SIGINT Effort

3. By the last quarter of 1961, increased requirements on Cuba had already caused diversion of existing NSA resources to the Cuban problem. By 14 April 1962, additional personnel had been transferred from other tasks or hired from the outside. This augmentation continued throughout the period under review. NSA analytic and reporting personnel directly assigned to the Cuban problem increased from 5 in April 1960, to 52 in April 1961, to 83 in April 1962, and to 171 by 14 October 1962. These personnel were supported by personnel and facilities of the collection management, machine processing, central reference, and research and development areas of NSA, as well as by processing and analytic personnel of intercept stations. Additionally, processing and analysis in the Soviet production areas at NSA and overseas produced SIGINT relating to Cuba. In effecting the build-up in Cuban processing and analysis within NSA, the Director, NSA, was discharging his normal management control responsibilities as a concurrent action to the SIGINT collection build-up described in Section IV of this report. The processing and analysis build-up required not only inputs of

qualified SIGINT technicians, but also inputs of development techniques, equipment, and management know how. As a parallel action, the SIGINT effort on those target areas which surrendered resources to the Cuba problem had to be managed so that an acceptable level of SIGINT output continued. This was accomplished to the satisfaction of the intelligence community.

4. During the period the SIGINT analysis consisted of field efforts at points of intercept and the national effort at NSA. Field efforts were applied to exploitable items, often perishable and always of immediate interest. The analytic processes at NSA were based on substantive analysis as applied to plain-text and decrypted traffic, supported by other analytical and technical tools such as cryptanalysis, traffic analysis, voice transcription and machine processing. Large volumes of intercept had to be made ready for the analytic process. [redacted] In addressing the

weekly staff meeting of the Secretary of Defense on 8 October 1962, the Director, NSA, reported excellent progress [redacted] The automated processing itself is continually being improved through progressive refinement, consolidation and condensation of its component parts.

5. In addition to publishing intelligence information NSA developed, well in advance of 14 October, numerous technical aids, files and IBM listings which have been used extensively by SIGINT production analysts as well as intelligence analysts of other departments and agencies. Typical was the large file on Cuban and Soviet personalities.

State Department Analysis

6. Within the Department of State, the responsibility for analysis on intelligence community matters rested with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), specifically the Office of Research and Analysis for Soviet Bloc (RSB), the Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics (RAR), and the

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Office of Current Intelligence Indications (RCI). Within RSB the work was divided largely between two divisions: Bloc International Economic Activities Division and Bloc International Political Activities Division. The work on Cuba in these divisions was assigned to the most experienced intelligence research officers available, one of whom had served for a considerable period as principal analyst on Soviet-Cuban relations. INR officers drew upon their own extensive files of previously accumulated intelligence information from State and other agency sources; from Soviet, Cuban and other publications; and from reports from friendly embassies in Havana.

DIA's Role

7. Within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), all reports received from the various collection facilities were processed from three particular but closely related points of view; namely, warning and indications of hostilities, significance of current trends or new developments, and impact on estimates. The primary responsibility for the processing of information to meet each of these objectives was assigned to separate organization entities. Clear lines of administrative and operational coordination were

established to insure that each function was not performed in isolation and did not retard processing to accomplish other objectives.

8. From 14 April through early August the DIA analytical mechanism operated using normal command lines. Thereafter, the Latin American Section of the Current Intelligence Division and the Latin American Division of the Estimates Office increased the analytical coverage of the Cuban situation. During September plans were made for the establishment of a Cuban Situation Room with responsibility for the analytical processes on Cuba and the creation of an associated Task Group to study the sophisticated equipment introduced into Cuba. As a result of this realignment, DIA was able to provide coordinated intelligence on the Soviet Bloc equipment and troops at any hour of the day.

CIA Production

9. Analysis was performed in CIA by the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI). These offices were organized to focus appropriate human skills on various specific

scientific, economic, and geographic fields, with particular emphasis on the Soviet Bloc and a high priority on Soviet weapons systems.

10. Planning for an increased coverage of non-Soviet offensive weapons systems was begun in early August; on 4 September a Non-Soviet Weapons Branch consisting of four intelligence officers was established in OSI. Although the branch had responsibility for other areas, the primary effort was devoted to the Cuban missile situation.

11. The Economic Research Area of ORR was engaged in research on the production and deployment of Soviet missiles, on the maritime transport of Soviet cargo, on analysis of internal Cuban economic problems, and on Soviet assistance to non-Bloc states--with Cuba being a major concern. By mid-August this organization was fully involved with the Cuban build-up. The maritime portion of ORR had been continuously involved with deliveries to Cuba since the USSR first shipped quantities of arms in the fall of 1960.

12. In the case of reports concerning missiles in Cuba, both ORR and OSI were involved since it was necessary to determine

the characteristics of the missiles being deployed as well as the deployment pattern being followed.

13. OCI was engaged throughout the period in producing summaries of current evidence on Cuban developments, making evaluations of new developments in briefing memoranda in support of the Board of National Estimates and the DCI, and maintaining coverage of the Cuban situation in formal current intelligence publications. The Cuban Daily and Weekly Summaries furnished selected information to support clandestine collection in Cuba.

14. The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) played a most important role in the processing of intelligence information and in the support of other intelligence processing components. When new photography was collected over Cuba, the initial photographic interpretation report was concerned primarily with the photographic COMOR-established targets, but also covered unforeseen items of interest discovered in the photography. This initial report was prepared in the course of one or two days. Subsequently, if working time permitted, a Mission Coverage Index was prepared giving a detailed, frame-by-frame description of what was shown in the photography.

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Summary

15. The volume of information from SIGINT, photography, naval observers, refugees, and clandestine sources was so great and the detailed evaluation and analyses of this material required such an outlay of man power that the intelligence community would have been hard pressed to devote a similar effort to a similar problem occurring in some other part of the world at the same time.

16. The process began with the reporting from the European narrows. From this source the analyst, experienced in studying Bloc arms traffic, followed a suspect arms-carrying ship to an identified destination. SIGINT provided information on daily positions, tonnages, destinations, and cargoes, as well as Soviet attempts to deny or falsify this information. On sailings from the Baltic, SIGINT often provided the initial information. Low-altitude Navy photography provided a means of examination of deck cargo only. The missiles themselves were stored in the holds of ships with elongated hatches.

17. The earliest physical indication of a SAM system was the identification on the decks of some early August arrivals of

the types of construction and transport equipment called for in the Soviet-Indonesian 1961 contract as part of a SAM system. Deliveries of certain types of aircraft were identified by the unique crating used for deck transport.

18. SIGINT indicated a very short unloading period, occasionally the port of unloading, and the return voyage in ballast. Agent and refugee reporting, correlated with other information, initially revealed ten locations of unidentified Soviet activity. Photography of 29 August confirmed Soviet activity at most of these points and showed over half to be SAM installations.

19. Refugee and agent reports were especially useful in establishing a chronology of events dealing with the eviction of Cuban tenant farmers to make way for Soviet occupancy.

20. Despite suspicions generated by a long history of false missile reports (see Section V, paras. 1 and 2), the analytical system fed into the COMOR targeting program those refugee and agent reports that helped lead to the photographic discovery of the MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba.

21. In sum, the analytic effort, using a variety of sources, identified each of the major weapons systems introduced into Cuba before the system reached operational capability. This could not have been achieved without painstaking preparation of collection guidance, continuity in following similar developments in other areas, and meticulous attention to the hundreds of information reports received.

22. Finally, any post-mortem of the U.S. intelligence effort in regard to the offensive missile build-up in Cuba must take into account whether there was a planned Soviet deception program to help cover their activities. There is little hard evidence on this pro or con, and may never be unless there is a knowledgeable Soviet defector, or Soviet files become available. However, we know of the extensive activities of the Soviet "Disinformation" bureau, which is charged with covert psychological warfare against the West. We would also cite the frequent assurances by various Soviet officials to U.S. policy-level officials that there would be no offensive weapons placed in Cuba, and particularly the use of one low-level Embassy official in Washington to allegedly carry a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev to the Attorney General.

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VIII. THE INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

1. The most immediate reflection of the intelligence analysts' work appears first in current intelligence publications and later in estimative papers.

2. The only fully and formally coordinated all-source community publication dealing with current intelligence is the weekly USIB Combined Watch Report. It is not a comprehensive current intelligence publication but rather presents community conclusions as to indications of hostile intent on the part of any Sino-Soviet Bloc country toward the U.S., U.S. forces abroad, U.S. allies, or areas peripheral to the Bloc. It also examines situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Communist hostile action which could jeopardize U.S. security.

3. Thus the Watch Report's content is confined to crisis areas and situations on which the community needs to be kept informed. Such topics are treated in the Watch Report only after they are formally placed on the agenda of the Watch Committee. On 21 August the USIB Watch Committee placed Cuba on its agenda and initially assessed the situation at its 28 August meeting. Verbatim extracts on the arms build-up from this publication appear as ANNEX E.

4. The most comprehensive all-source current intelligence publication which is widely circulated in the community is the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), printed at about 0400 every day except Sunday. It is published by CIA after formal consultation with representatives of the other community members.

5. From 14 April to 4 August there were only two Cuban items in the CIB. On the latter date all-source intelligence on shipping had led to the conclusion that "Soviet military aid deliveries to Cuba may have been accelerated recently," and the CIB so stated.

6. Thereafter the CIB continued to report much of the evidence as it came into the possession of the community, with five other items in August, twelve in September, and six in the first half of October.

7. The DIA Daily Intelligence Summary similarly reported the Cuban military build-up and subsequent developments on an all-source basis (extracts in ANNEX H).

8. Because of restrictions on publishing information concerning offensive weapons in Cuba, there were delays and gaps in the published information (see paras. 19 through 27 below).

For example, in early September printing of information about a new kind of missile site in eastern Cuba was delayed until its nature could be identified by a detailed study of U-2 photography, although key officials with a need to know were kept informed.

9. The purpose of the restraint on publishing was to restrict the information to those who needed to know it for purposes of analysis and action. The effect was to concentrate the information at the decision-making levels of the Government.

10. Within these restrictions, departmental current intelligence publications recorded the progress of the build-up. Among those were the State Department's Diplomatic Summary (extracts in ANNEX I) and the CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Review. These, of course, reported Cuban matters along with intelligence from the rest of the world.

11. CIA current intelligence publications dealing only with Cuba require special mention. In March 1962 the Cuban Daily Summary and the Cuban Weekly Summary were established to furnish direct support to officers responsible for clandestine collection operations in Cuba. Although not originally created for that specific purpose,

these publications reported in more detail than any others on the arms build-up but they too were subject to the publishing restrictions. As the community effort against Cuba gathered momentum their circulation was broadened.

12. Extracts from the Current Intelligence Bulletin, the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and the two Cuban summaries appear in ANNEX G. Also included are extracts from the Current Intelligence Digest, the "Secret" counterpart of the CIB. (See similar extracts in ANNEX H from DIA's secret level publication, the DIA Intelligence Bulletin.)

13. Two CIA publications of rigidly limited circulation were issued daily for the information of the highest policy levels of Government. The President's Intelligence Checklist was brief in content and produced only for the President, and with the President's specific permission it was provided to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and General Maxwell Taylor. Because of its limited readership it was specifically exempt from the restriction on publishing information about offensive weapons in Cuba. However, it contained none because

the information available, even after 20 September, was not hard enough to permit the writing of a credible item. Checklist excerpts dealing with Cuba are given in ANNEX D.

14. Cuban Highlights was established on 27 August because of concern over the Cuban arms build-up and a desire to bring the situation to the attention of policy makers. Its distribution was broadened beyond that of the Checklist to include the Special Group (Augmented). It was discontinued with the 19 September issue, because its content by then was duplicating that of the CIB. The complete file appears as ANNEX F.

15. Based on current intelligence indications, USIB agencies produced numerous departmental memoranda and briefing papers dealing with special and general aspects of the crisis. Examples of these are the State Department's Research Memoranda and Intelligence Notes, pertinent excerpts from which appear in ANNEX J.

16. The various admonitions and restrictions that worked to inhibit the flow of raw information into intelligence publications require some explanation.

17. Because of his reservations concerning Cuban order of battle estimates, the DCI in May 1962 instructed analysts in CIA to check out with NPIC any report that was susceptible to photographic verification. Analysts in other agencies also made extensive use of the NPIC facility. In mid-August the DCI briefed the President on the increasing volume of refugee and agent reports on the Soviet build-up in Cuba. The President directed that every effort be made to check out these continuing reports. The DCI instructed the DD/I to check every available source, particularly including NPIC.

18. The instruction to use NPIC to check information reporting was intended to verify by all available means the authenticity of refugee and agent reports; however, the instruction came to be interpreted by the CIA analysts as a restriction on publishing anything that could not be verified by NPIC, and, with the exception of an 18 August item suggesting the possibility of SAM site construction, nothing susceptible to photographic verification was published in the CIB, the Cuban Daily Summary or the President's Checklist that had not been so verified. Thus, during the later days of August when the SAM build-up was well under way, an

instruction to use all available analytical tools came to operate as a limitation on publication.

19. The first instruction that intentionally restricted the publication of information on the Cuban arms build-up was not issued intil the end of August. On 29 August U-2 photography first confirmed establishment of a missile defense in western Cuba and also revealed a missile site at Banes in eastern Cuba, the nature of which could not immediately be determined. On 31 August the President ordered USIB, through the Acting DCI, not to allow publication of this information until U. S. policy-makers had established a course of action. This initial restriction was broadened to allow analysts access to the information. On 4 September the President announced the presence of a missile defense system in Cuba. Thereafter the community was able to publish information on SAM sites. The information on the Banes site was published on 17 September after detailed photo analysis had shown that site to be a defensive cruise missile installation.

20. The restriction on publishing intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba was discussed in USIB executive sessions on

7 and 13 September. USIB agencies were under injunction not to print any such intelligence in any publication. Individual agency instructions stressed that normal distribution of raw reports was to continue. The CIA instruction specifically exempted the President's Intelligence Checklist from the restriction and said further that "any material which might ordinarily be thought to be publishable on this forbidden subject" should be brought to the attention of the Assistant Director for Current Intelligence.

21. The restriction was thus established just a few days before reports of actual sighting of offensive missiles began to come in from ground observers in Cuba. None of this information, indicative as it was of a qualitative change in the nature of the arms build-up, appeared in intelligence publications, including the President's Checklist, though it did go to analysts with a need to know and was used in the targeting exercise which ultimately led to the 14 October U-2 mission. (The information also was included in briefings and memoranda prepared by DIA for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.)

22. There was one exception to the restrictions. In early October a shipment of IL-28 medium jet bombers arrived in Cuba,

and the intelligence community had pictures of crates deck-loaded on ships to prove it. In order to publish this information it was necessary to get White House permission because of the offensive capability of this bomber. Permission was granted and the information was published on 11 October.

23. However, at the time this permission was granted the President instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to put into effect a system to ensure rigid control of information on offensive weapons. A special USIB meeting on 11 October put this verbal order into effect by establishing the so-called PSALM system effective 12 October.

24. The USIB implementation of the Presidential directive provided that information or intelligence on offensive capabilities in Cuba ". . . will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisors to the President have a need to know" and that "there is no intent hereby, however, to inhibit the essential analytic process."

25. The effect of this instruction was to limit dissemination of raw information on offensive weapons in Cuba to USIB principals only. Each principal was responsible for the handling of the information in accordance with the criteria established above.

26. The PSALM system remained in effect until after the President's speech on 22 October.

IX. THE ESTIMATES ON CUBA

1. Before the discovery of strategic missiles in Cuba on 14 October the community had, in 1962, produced two National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) and one Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Cuba and one SNIE which dealt with Cuba in the context of the Caribbean area. They were as follows:

SNIE 80-62,	"The Threat to U.S. Security Interests in the Caribbean Area," dated 17 January.
NIE 85-62,	"The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March.
NIE 85-2-62,	"The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 1 August.
SNIE 85-3-62,	"The Military Build-Up in Cuba," dated 19 September.

2. Each of these estimates discussed the possibility of Soviet use of Cuba as a strategic base, and each, including that of 19 September, concluded that the Soviets would consider the risk of U.S. retaliation too great. The preparation and consideration of each estimate involved wide community participation and discussion. Many differing views were brought forward, but each estimate was approved by the USIB without reservation.

3. The problem with which the intelligence estimators were faced was complex. It involved (a) over-all Soviet policy, including Soviet policy with respect to the U.S.; (b) Soviet policy in Latin America; and (c) Soviet relations with Castro, Soviet purposes in Cuba, and more specifically the military build-up.

4. Through long experience in estimating Soviet policy the estimators had developed some sense of the limits within which the Soviets might operate. Though there was less on the record with respect to Soviet policy in Latin America as compared with other parts of the world, until 1962 Soviet behavior in that area had been consistent with practice elsewhere.

5. Estimates on the Soviet military build-up in Cuba were based on three essential calculations:

a. That Soviet policy with respect to the U.S. was to avoid the risk of a confrontation which would entail a high degree of risk of losing Cuba or going to war;

b. That Soviet policy with respect to Cuba and Latin America was designed to win a victory for communism by other than conventional military means, and that the Soviets considered that this policy would be compromised by the establishment of a strategic base;

c. That the Soviet military build-up in Cuba as known to us before 14 October 1962 probably comported with these policies.

6. Until 14 October the evidence on the military build-up did not clearly indicate to the estimators that the Soviets would accept the risks involved in deploying offensive weapons systems to Cuba. The size and speed of the build-up and the obvious military advantage the Soviets would gain from a strategic base in Cuba caused them to examine this contingency in detail in preparing the 19 September estimate. They concluded, however, that such an action would involve an unacceptable degree of risk and would therefore be unlikely.

7. The following are the conclusions of SNIE 85-3-62:

"a. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military build-up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the U.S. may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by

enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke U.S. military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.

"b. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 September, they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home, it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America.

"c. As the build-up continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose, but of a more 'offensive' character; e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of

short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM's). A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a U.S. military reaction.

"d. The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely. Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations.

"e. The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than to the technical implications of the military build-up.

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Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intrusion into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one to be met by the U.S. and not their responsibility. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the USSR was establishing an 'offensive' base in Cuba, most Latin American governments would expect the U.S. to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement."

8. By 19 September, the date of the estimate, MRBM's had already been brought ashore in Cuba; however, reports of this event by agents and refugees did not begin to reach the community until a day or two after the estimate was written. Once received, these reports set off the targeting process that led to the discovery of the MRBM's by photography.

9. Reviews of the four estimates are presented in ANNEX L.

X. CHRONOLOGY OF CUBAN U-2 OVERFLIGHTS

1. Overhead reconnaissance of Cuba with U-2 aircraft began on 26 October 1960. Between that date and 12 October 1962, when operational control of U-2 overflights was transferred to the Strategic Air Command, USAF, CIA flew a total of 54 missions. Of these, three aborted because of aircraft malfunctions, two because of camera malfunctions, two because of contrails, and two encountered heavier cloud cover than had been forecast. Maps showing tracks flown 5 August - 14 October 1962 appear at Tab D.

2. As of mid-April 1962, the beginning of the period under review, missions were authorized at the rate of two per month.

3. On 14 June 1962, the Special Group approved a COMOR recommendation that two additional flights be authorized for June.

4. At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on 12 July Mr. McCone pointed out that photographic reconnaissance of Cuba had enabled NPIC to make a study of military barracks and other facilities which showed that Cuba had sufficient housing on its military installations to accommodate the existing order of battle estimate of a 75,000-man military force. The Group agreed to continue with the already authorized schedule of two flights per month.

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5. Extract from Special Group Minutes, 19 July 1962

"Mr. McCone summed up his proposals for reconnaissance overflights as follows: . . . Cuba: Monthly coverage, requiring two flights a month. It was noted that (the proposal) is covered by existing authorization. . . . It was further noted that the Group will approve, through the medium of the CIA Monthly Forecast, flights planned for each succeeding month. . . ."

6. Mission No. 3086 was successfully flown on schedule on 5 August. The east-bound leg covered the Isle of Pines, the Cienfuegos area, and the Santiago de Cuba/Guantanamo area. The flight turned at the eastern tip of the island, returned across the Banes area and continued inland up the length of the island, exiting at the western end of Pinar del Rio Province. This mission probably was just a few days too early to detect the first emplacement of surface-to-air missiles. On 15 August DIA requested a further readout of the photography, which revealed possible SA-2 missiles on trailers near two of the sites. Also, after readout of the 29 August photography, a recheck of the 5 August photography revealed that construction activity (not then identifiable in nature) had begun at some of the sites in early August.

7. In a memorandum (COMOR-D-24/14), dated 13 August, Subject: "Requirements for U-2 Coverage of Cuba," the Chairman of the COMOR noted that:

"The last mission, one of two approved by the Special Group on 30 July for reconnaissance of Cuba, was accomplished on 5 August. Because of certain camera malfunctions, the photography is not up to standard. COMOR Priority I requirements were not adequately met. The photography obtained did not satisfy the CIA/DDP requirement. In light of the foregoing COMOR concludes as follows: . . . That the COMOR priority requirements in Cuba should be covered by U-2 recce during August. (This would probably take two missions.) It is proposed that these be planned so as to meet those requirements and in addition the operational requirements for CIA/DDP."

8. Mission No. 3087 was scheduled for 8 August. Bad weather and operational factors caused cancellation on that date. The Special Group met on 9 August.

Extract from Special Group Minutes, 9 August 1962

"The Group agreed that the second mission authorized for August should be undertaken whenever the DCI decides that

the immediate situation with respect to Soviet material justifies it. It was noted that this will use up the existing authorization for August and that if a third mission should be come necessary later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at that time."

9. On 10 August, the weather was looked at for a possible mission 3087 on 12 August. The weather forecast resulted in cancellation at the alert briefing. Another alert was scheduled for 17 August. Between 17 and 24 August, the weather was checked daily for a possible flight. The mission went to Go-No-Go on 24 August; however, the weather still was bad and mission 3087 was cancelled.

10. Mission 3088 was delayed because of bad weather from 25 to 29 August, when it was successfully flown. This completed the authorized number of missions for August. The mission was flown overland from the western end of the island to the eastern tip, turned around, and flew back. Readout of the photography identified eight SAM sites (Bahia Honda, Cienfuegos, Havana, La Caloma, Mariel, San Julian, Santa Lucia, and Matanzas) and what was later learned to be a cruise missile site at Banes.

11. In the 30 August meeting of the Special Group the CIA forecast for the two approved flights for September was considered.

Extract from Special Group Minutes, 30 August 1962

"The Agency's monthly forecast was reviewed and noted. All of the flights contained therein had been previously approved. General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba."

12. A special meeting of COMOR on 1 September reviewed the situation in Cuba in the light of results of the 29 August mission, which made it necessary to recast the planning for the September flights. A member of the CIA Operations Center (U-2) was present at the meeting. The requirements for the next flight (the first in September) were agreed upon and were immediately available to the Operations Center through the presence of its representative at the meeting. There was no necessity for Special Group action since by its approval of 19 July two flights per month were permitted, and none had yet been flown in September.

13. Because of the known existence of SAM sites on the island and the consequent danger to overflight plus the need for clarification of the nature of the site at Banes, COMOR thought the first flight proposed for September to be of sufficient significance to warrant its being brought to the attention of the Acting DCI. A memorandum

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was forwarded to the Acting DCI on 4 September outlining the COMOR recommendations for the flight then being planned and asking for his approval. It reads:

"1. Your approval of paragraph 4 is requested.

"2. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance reviewed the results of the latest mission on Cuba (No. 3088) flown on 29 August and concluded as follows:

a. That in view of finding SAM sites on the western end of the island on 3088, it is particularly important that as soon as weather permits the next authorized mission should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed because of weather or because the range did not permit.

b. That the priority areas of interest should be the areas referenced in a above and to include other targets on a second priority basis which might require recoverage.

c. That the complex at the eastern end of the island should be photographed again, but there is no requirement at this time for recoverage of the SAM sites.

"3. The targets for operational planning will be prepared by the COMOR Working Group in pursuance of the above and forwarded directly to the Intelligence Officer/OSA/DDR for use in operational planning.

"4. Recommendation: That the foregoing be taken into account in determination of when the next Cuban mission will be flown."

The recommendation was approved by the Acting DCI.

14. Mission No. 3089 was successfully flown on schedule on 5 September over the eastern and central portions of the island. There was heavy cloud cover over eastern Cuba, including the Banes area. Three additional SAM sites were detected in the central portion of the island (Sagua la Grande, Sancti Spiritus, and Caibarien).

15. In late August and early September the Acting DCI requested that an examination be made of the feasibility of supplementing U-2 coverage with low-level tactical aerial reconnaissance. On 1 and 3 September COMOR met to consider the kind of information that could be obtained through use of RF-101/F8U-type aircraft. They reported that:

"Tactical-type reconnaissance aircraft could acquire information on the identified SAM sites which would permit more reliable estimates of the operational status. This can be derived from observation of personnel activity, rotation of antennae and missiles at the ready position. It was recognized that acquiring this information could provide details of similar equipment deployed in the Soviet Union, which is not susceptible to overflight reconnaissance."

Note: Subsequent actions on the proposal to use low-level aircraft over Cuba are described in paragraphs 18, 19 and 21.

16. On 8 September the COMOR reviewed Mission 3089 (5 September) and forwarded the results of its review to the Acting DCI in a memorandum dated 9 September 1962:

"1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has now reviewed the information obtained from the last U-2 reconnaissance of Cuba (Mission 3089). Unfortunately weather precluded photography of the possible surface-to-surface missile site at Banes on the eastern end of the island as well as a portion of the Guantanamo area. The mission also did not cover the Isle of Pines (to check on SAM deployment) and other areas in the eastern half of the

island which should be searched for SAM and possible SSM deployment.

"2. The Committee recommends that another U-2 mission be flown as soon as weather permits to cover Banes and the other targets mentioned above."

17. On 9 September the Chairman COMOR was informed by the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, that the Secretary of State had raised a question whether the information needed on Banes could be obtained by peripheral reconnaissance means. (Note: Peripheral photography in other areas had operated from 20 miles out.) The COMOR met on 10 September to consider the Secretary's question and concluded as follows:

"Peripheral photography could satisfy some of the objectives planned for coverage in the current proposed U-2 mission; i.e., those objectives on the north and south coast and some of the Isle of Pines. It could not satisfy requirements in the Guantanamo area nor search which may be required later for SAM's further inland nor for future MIG-21 count on inland bases nor for technical intelligence which may be required on already known or yet to be found missile sites."

18. On 10 September, the Acting DCI addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (COMOR-D-24/16), which read in part:

"It is recommended that you initiate the necessary action (including Special Group approval) to provide for the employment. . . of tactical-type reconnaissance against Banes or other targets as are identified in COMOR-D-24/15, which was made available to DIA on 1 September 1962."

19. A special meeting was held in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's office on 10 September. It should be noted that the meeting followed closely on the heels of two U-2 incidents: the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin on 30 August and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on 8 September. Mr. Thomas A. Parrott, on 11 September, prepared the following memorandum on this meeting:

"At a meeting in Mr. Bundy's office yesterday, attended by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence and others, the Secretary expressed concern at the Agency's (CIA's) planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He

said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. He felt, however, that it is unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the U.S. in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

"Taking these views into account, the Agency (CIA) plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts--the Isle of Pines, the area roughly east of longitude 77 west, and two legs along the coast--one north and one south." (Note: The Secretary of State made the proposal that the flight be broken into four parts.)

Because of the limited number of flights authorized, CIA made it a practice not to fly unless weather over most of the critical targets

was less than 25 per cent overcast. The poor weather in September and the necessity to fly four separate missions instead of only one resulted in prolonging the time needed to get the requested photographic coverage.

20. At its 14 September meeting the Special Group considered the proposal that low-level photographic coverage be obtained on certain targets.

Extracts from Special Group Minutes, 14 September

"Colonel Steakley (JCS) outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered until the results of Agency (CIA) reconnaissance in the same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present." (Note: The reference here is to the cruise missile site at Banes, which had not been identified conclusively at the time of the meeting.)

21. Mission No. 3090 was considered during the period 6 to 16 September. The weather was checked daily. The mission went

to Go-No-Go on 16 September, but the weather turned bad and the mission was cancelled.

22. Mission No. 3091 was flown over Banes and the Guantanamo area on 17 September; however, the mission was negated because of heavy cloud cover.

23. Mission No. 3092 could not be flown between 18 and 21 September because of bad weather and was cancelled.

24. Mission No. 3093 was under consideration from 22 September and was flown on 26 September, covering the Guantanamo area and the site at Banes. SAM sites were discovered at Chaparra, Jiguani, and Los Angeles.

25. CIA in its monthly forecast requested one mission for October and permission to carry over into October any of the flights approved for September which had not yet been flown. At the time the forecast was drafted four flights remained in the approved September program. The Special Group approved the request on 27 September.

26. Mission No. 3094 was alerted on 27 September, and was cancelled on 28 September because of bad weather.

27. Mission No. 3095 was originally approved to cover only the Isle of Pines. On or about 28 September, Mr. McCone called Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, and got approval to include coverage of the Bay of Pigs area. The flight was successfully flown on 29 September. The SAM and the cruise missile sites at Siguanea on the Isle of Pines were discovered.

28. Mission Nos. 3096 and 3097 were considered during the period 29 September through 2 October. Both were cancelled because of bad weather. A satellite mission, 29 September to 2 October, programmed to cover Cuba, yielded no usable photography of Cuba because of cloud cover.

29. From 18 September through 2 October agent and refugee reports (see Section V, paras. 15 through 23) dovetailed sufficiently to create the hypothesis that there was something of unusual importance going on in a definite area west of Havana and that ground observer reports of missile site construction there needed to be confirmed or denied by photography. The DIA on 3 October forwarded to COMOR a memorandum stressing the need for photographic coverage of suspected MRBM areas. On 3 October COMOR

completed a targeting based on analysis of the reports. On 4 October in a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) the DCI pointed out that CIA was restricted to using the U-2's in the southeast quadrant of Cuba because of the SAM sites. He questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at that time, particularly when the SAM's almost certainly were not yet operational. The NRO together with CIA and JCS were instructed to prepare and present to the Special Group (Augmented) on 9 October a program for Cuban reconnaissance involving all types of vehicles available for such use and considering their vulnerabilities to Cuban air defense.

30. There was a difference of opinion in the 4 October Special Group (Augmented) meeting on whether a restriction had been imposed on overflying known SA-2 sites. Because of the skimpiness of records, it cannot now be discovered whether there was or was not such a restriction. It is clear, however, that the operational elements were under the impression that such a restriction did exist. Evidence of this belief can be found in the reference to such a restriction by the DCI at the 4 October meeting of the Special Group (Augmented).

31. Mission No. 3098 was delayed because of weather on 3 October. It was alerted on 4 October and successfully flew the mission on 5 October. The track was along the periphery of the southeastern coast. The Manzanillo SA-2 site was discovered.

32. Mission No. 3099 was launched on 6 October, but it aborted due to mechanical difficulties. For operational reasons and for matters of record, when missions are cancelled or aborted due to mechanical troubles or to weather after alert procedures have been initiated, succeeding missions, which usually (but not always) follow the same flight plan of the cancelled mission, are assigned a new mission serial number.

33. Mission No. 3100 was successfully flown on 7 October, This was a peripheral mission along the northeastern coast. Four more SAM sites were discovered (Chambas, Esmeralda, Manati, and Senado).

34. USIB-D-41. 5/25 (COMOR-D-24/20), dated 5 October 1962, "Intelligence Justification for U-2 Overflight of Cuba," recommended frequent and regular U-2 coverage of Cuba to the extent that the primary objectives would be covered once a month. This recommendation, which resulted from a DIA memorandum of 3 October, together with the decision of the Special Group (Augmented) on 9 October to overfly a SAM site in western Cuba,

(16)

led to the track selected for the 14 October flight. The USIB memorandum reads in part:

> "There is now a pressing and continuing need for up-to-date intelligence on the progress of the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba. . . . The items of most immediate concern are the missile installations springing up all over the island . . . The absence of coverage of the western end since August 29, coupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means that there may well be many more sites now being built of which we are unaware. Ground observers have, in several recent instances, reported sightings of what they believe to be the SS-4 (SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or denied by photo coverage. It is also necessary to know how many KOMAR-class PGMG's may be in service. . . . The COMOR recognizes the increased risk to the aircraft in light of the SA-2 and MIG-21 aircraft present there, but it must be stated that the current need is extremely urgent and the risk involved should be very thoroughly weighed before this coverage is denied."

35. On 9 October the Special Group (Augmented) discussed the spectrum of possible reconnaissance activities. It was agreed

that first priority should be given to one U-2 mission in the western part of the island. If this flight did not activate ground-to-air fire, a number of similar sorties would be mounted.

36. The 7 October flight completed the four missions authorized for September. Intelligence justification for an October mission had been completed and was awaiting approval by a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) scheduled for 9 October. Thus, there was a stand-down of aircraft on 8 and 9 October.

37. Mission No. 3101 was considered from 10 to 12 October. The weather was checked daily, but there was no alert. On 12 October operational control of U-2 overflights of Cuba was transferred to the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force. Weather precluded a mission on 13 October.

38. Mission No. 3101 was flown by SAC on 14 October over an area west of Havana to test the operational readiness of SAM sites and to look for suspected SSM activity. The flight was the first to discover the presence of MRBM's.

39. On 16 October approval was given for an unlimited number of flights over Cuba.

40. The Strategic Air Command, United States Air Force, flew 20 missions between 14 and 22 October, two of which were unsuccessful due to camera malfunction and one of which was a partial failure because of film run-out.

41. At Tab D are appended maps showing the U-2 overflight tracks, respectively for August, September, and the first half of October; a separate map shows the track flown over the San Cristobal area (the quadrilateral figure was the area of which analysts became suspicious as a result of an agent report); the final map shows the tracks flown by SAC from 15 through 22 October.

XI. COMMUNITY ACTIONS, 14-22 OCTOBER 1962

1. This section summarizes the actions of the intelligence community from 14 October, when offensive missiles were first photographed in Cuba, until 22 October when the President addressed the nation.

2. Within 24 hours of the first tentative identification of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, the community had taken the dimensions of the crisis and geared to meet it. Round-the-clock schedules had been set up to process raw information and photography, correlate information from all sources, report developments swiftly, and prepare estimates both as to the meaning of the events and the likely Soviet reactions to U.S. moves.

3. On 14 October, U-2 Mission 3101 was flown. The photographs were analyzed at NPIC where, by the afternoon of 15 October, a tentative identification of an offensive Soviet missile capability in Cuba had been made. By continuing analysis the identification was made more firm and the missiles were determined to be of at least 700-mile and possibly 1000-mile range.

4. On the morning of 16 October, top government officials were briefed on the photographs and on NPIC's analysis which

concluded that there was now present in Cuba a mobile MRBM launch site and two new military encampments along the southern edge of the Sierra del Rosario in west central Cuba. At least 14 canvas-covered missile trailers had been spotted. The site observed was judged to be not yet operational, but the need to search for other sites which might be ready for action was obvious. Beginning 17 October multiple flights were flown daily.

5. The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) of USIB was charged with preparing an immediate evaluation of the situation. The committee agreed that the missiles observed were probably those reported by ground observers in September, that they were clearly under Soviet control, and that the site would probably eventually hold as many as 24 missiles. There was no evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads.

6. Also on 16 October COMOR met to review target planning, the Watch Committee directed the National Indications Center to monitor closely any Soviet actions elsewhere in the world to determine how the Cuban events might fit into a broader picture, and the Board of National Estimates concluded that the Soviets would not risk nuclear war if the U.S. took direct action against Cuba.

7. On 17 October the USIB called for a new estimate, and by evening SNIE 11-17-62, "Implications for Soviet Policy of Missile Deployment in Cuba", had been drafted. USIB also directed GMAIC, together with NPIC and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) to provide a continuing community assessment of the problem, including 24-hour-a-day support from NPIC. Considering the results of U-2 mission 3102, flown 15 October, GMAIC estimated that at least 16 and possibly 32 missiles of 1020-nautical-mile range would be operational within a week or so.

8. On 18 October the first GMAIC-JAEIC-NPIC Joint Evaluation, one of a series issued daily until 11 November, estimated that MRBM's could be launched from Cuba within 18 hours.

9. On 18 October the DCI asked USIB to consider the Soviet reaction to three possible courses of U.S. action:

a. To do nothing about the offensive missiles.

b. To initiate a total or limited blockade under a declaration of war against Cuba.

c. To take military action to destroy the missile sites and to invade Cuba.

10. After USIB discussion of these and related alternatives, SNIE 11-18-62 was prepared. The main conclusions were:

a. "If the U.S. accepts the strategic missile build-up in Cuba, the Soviets would continue the build-up of strategic weapons in Cuba. We have no basis for estimating the force level which they would wish to reach, but it seems clear already that they intend to go beyond a token capability. They would probably expect their missile forces in Cuba to make some contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the U.S.

b. "U.S. acceptance of the strategic missile build-up would provide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America and elsewhere. Conversely, anti-Communists and those who relate their own interests to those of the U.S. would be strongly discouraged. It seems clear that, especially over the long run, there would be a loss of confidence in U.S. power and determination and a serious decline of U.S. influence generally.

c. "If the U.S. confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge of the MRBM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, they would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign

bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the U.S. of tight control over the missiles. They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to U.S. actions in Cuba.

d. "There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers to negotiate, continued build-up, and counterpressures, and we think the result in the end would be the same.

e. "Any warning would of course degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent U.S. attack.

f. "If the U.S. takes direct military action against Cuba, the Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save Cuba, would inflict an offsetting injury to U.S. interests. This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to neutralize the strategic missiles, or these missiles plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile sites, or in fact an outright invasion designed to destroy the Castro regime.

g. "In reaction to any of the various forms of U.S. action, the Soviets would be alarmed and agitated, since they have to date estimated that the U.S. would not take military action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear war. They would recognize that U.S. military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war.

h. "On the other hand, the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island. This situation provides them with a pretext for treating U.S. military action against Cuba as an affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe that the USSR would attack the U.S., either from Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firing.

i. "Since the USSR would not dare to resort to general war and could not hope to prevail locally, the Soviets would almost certainly consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. The timing and selection of such moves would depend heavily upon the immediate context of events and the USSR's appreciation of U.S. attitudes. The most likely location for broad retaliation outside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They might react here with major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace treaty.

j. "We believe that whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general war or take military measures, which in their calculation, would run the gravest risks of general war."

11. Beginning on 19 October the USIB met daily at 0830. The Joint Evaluation of that date concluded that there was a Soviet MRBM regiment at San Cristobal and one at Sagua la Grande and an IRBM regiment in the Guanajay area and that the Soviets intended to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base.

12. On 20 October the Joint Evaluation stated that "an emergency operational capability to launch some of the missiles

on hand within about eight hours could now exist at the four MRBM sites." It estimated full operational readiness for the San Cristobal sites by 25 October, for the Sagua la Grande sites by 1 November and for the Guanajay IRBM sites by 1-15 December. On 20 October a decision was made to send key intelligence officers abroad the next day to assist U.S. ambassadors in briefing the heads of state of the prinicpal U.S. allies.

13. On 21 October the Board of National Estimates concluded that the Soviets would initially try to forestall U.S. military action and would confine themselves to political and propaganda moves and probably an armed forces alert; also that they would be cautious in the face of U.S. determination but would probably continue the Cuban build-up if the U.S. position were ambiguous. They also concluded that the Soviets would not retaliate with major military action if the U.S. sank a Soviet ship while enforcing a blockade.

14. The Joint Evaluation of 21 October concluded that there would be at least five Soviet offensive missile regiments in Cuba with a salvo potential of about one half the current intercontinental ballistic missile threat from the Soviet Union.

15. During the week each agency alerted all its overseas collection facilities to give top priority to reporting any intelligence bearing on indications of hostile Soviet action.

16. On 22 October Mr. Roger Hilsman told the USIB of arrangements for conveying U.S. policy decisions to the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Major General Robert A. Breitweiser briefed army, navy, and air attaches of the OAS and NATO nations on the Cuban crisis.

17. The President's speech was given at 1900 on 22 October.

XII. CONCLUSIONS

1. Although the intelligence community's inquiry into its actions during the Cuban crisis revealed certain areas where shortcomings existed and where improvements should be made in various areas of intelligence collection and processing, the intelligence community operated extensively and well in connection with Cuba. Every major weapons system introduced into Cuba by the Soviets was detected, identified and reported (with respect to numbers, location and operational characteristics) before any one of these systems attained an operational capability.

2. A relatively short period of time ensued between the introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba, particularly strategic missiles, and the commencement of the flow, although meager, of tangible reports of their presence; detection of their possible presence and targeting of the suspect areas of their location was accomplished in a compressed time frame; and the intelligence cycle did move with extraordinary rapidity through the stages of collection, analysis, targeting for verification, and positive identification.

3. The very substantial effort directed toward Cuba was originated by an earlier concern with the situation in Cuba and the effort, already well under way, contributed to the detection and analysis of the Soviet build-up.

4. Information was disseminated and used.

5. Aerial photography was very effective and our best means of establishing hard intelligence.

6. The procedures adopted in September delayed photographic intelligence, but this delay was not critical, because photography obtained prior to about 17 October would not have been sufficient to warrant action or to solicit support from Western Hemisphere or NATO allies.

7. Agent reports helped materially; however, none giving significant information on offensive missiles reached the intelligence community or policy-makers until after mid-September. When received, they were used in directing aerial photography.

8. Some restrictions were placed on dissemination of information, but there is no indication that this restriction necessarily affected analytical work or actions by policy-makers.

9. The 19 September estimate, while indicating lack of probability that MRBM's would be placed in Cuba, did state that "this contingency must be examined carefully"; the estimators in preparing the 19 September estimate gave great weight to the philosophical argument concerning Soviet intentions and thus did not fully weigh the many indicators.

10. The estimate of 19 October on probable Soviet reactions was correct.

1c

TAB A

TAB A
SECTION II

TIMETABLE OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA

(July - October 1962)
(All dates approximate)

Date	Western Cuba	Central Cuba	Eastern Cuba
25-31 July	Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in western Cuban ports.		
1-5 August	Construction begins on SAM sites at Matanzas, Havana, Mariel, Bahia Honda, Santa Lucia, San Julian, & La Coloma.		
5-10 August			
10-15 August			
15-20 August	Soviet armored groups arrive at Santiago de las Vegas and Artemisa.	Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in central Cuban ports.	
20-25 August		Construction begins on SAM site at Cienfuegos.	
25-31 August			
1-5 September	Construction begins on Guanajay IRBM sites.	Construction begins on SAM sites at Sagua la Grande, Caibarien, & Sancti Spiritus.	

Date	Western Cuba	Central Cuba	Eastern Cuba
5-10 September		Soviet armored group arrives at Remedios.	
10-15 September			
15-20 September	Construction begins at San Cristobal MRBM sites.	Construction begins at Remedios IRBM site.	Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in eastern Cuban ports.
			Soviet armored group arrives at Holguin.
20-25 September			Construction begins on SAM sites at Los Angeles, Chaparra and Jiguani.
25-30 September		Construction begins at Sagua la Grande MRBM sites.	Construction begins on SAM sites at Manati, Senado, and Manzanillo.

NOTE: Construction of the remaining SAM sites, which apparently were considered less vital than those listed above to the protection of offensive missile bases in Cuba, began in late September or early October. Work probably began on the SAM site at Siguanea on the Isle of Pines in the last week of September and on the sites at Esmeralda, Chambas, Maldonado, Santiago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, and Deleite during the first half of October.

1d

TAB B

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
UNITED STATES
MIAMI
GULF OF MEXICO
Key West
WESTERN COMPLEX
CENTRAL C
Mariel
1-5 Aug.
Bahia Honda
1-5 Aug.
Santa Lucia
1-5 Aug.
Guanajay
1-5 Sept.
Havana
1-5 Aug.
Santiago de las Vegas
Mid-Aug.
Matanzas
1-5 Aug.
Deleite
10-15 Oct.
Sagua la Grande
25-30 Sept.
Sagua la Grande
1-5 Sept.
Artemisa
Mid-Aug
San Cristobal
15-20 Sept.
La Coloma
1-5 Aug.
San Julian
1-5 Aug.
Siguanea
Late Sept.
Cienfuegos
20-25 Aug.
Sancti Spiritus
1-5 Sept.
HAVANA
Santa Cruz del Norte
MATANZAS
Cardenas
Varadero
Jaruco
Madruga
San Nicolas
Guira de Melena
Bejucal
Surgidero de Batabano
Quivican
Guanajay
Artemisa
Mariel
Bahia Honda
Candelaria
San Cristobal
Paso Real
Canton
La Esperanza
Los Arroyos
Mantua
Guane
PINAR DEL RIO
Viñales
Consolacion del Sur
ARCHIPIELAGO DE LOS COLORADOS
GOLFO DE MONTEGO
GULF OF BATABANO
ISLE OF PINES
Nueva Gerona
Santa Barbara
Santa Fe
CABO PEPE
CABO SAN ANTONIO
CABO CORRIENTES
Cajaro
Mariel
Guanajay
Bejucal
Quivican
Guira de Melena
Surgidero de Batabano
Jaruco
Matanzas
Cardenas
Varadero
Santa Cruz del Norte
Madruga
San Nicolas
Los Arabos
Jagüey Grande
Colon
Perico
Cienfuegos
Rodas
Palmira
Cruces
Lajas
Rancho Veloso
Camajuani
Placetas
Sancti Spiritus
Fomento
Trinidad
Cabaiguan
Remedios
Caibarien
Sagua la Grande
Encrucijada
Quemado de Guines
Deleite
Corralillo
Cayo Cruz del Padre
Cayo Blanquizal
Cayo Sal
Cayo del Paraiso
Funas de Zaza
BANCO DE LOS JARDINES
CARIBBEAN SEA
LESSER CAYMANS
GRAND CAYMAN
MRBM and IRBM Sites
(Estimated date of beginning of construction)
SAM Sites
(Estimated date of beginning of construction)
Armored Groups
(Estimated date on site)
CUBA
(5-minute grid)
25 50 75 100 Nautical Miles
25 50 75 100 Statute Miles
32810
543 8-62

(1d)



ATLANTIC
OCEAN
NASSAU
NEW PROVIDENCE
ELEUTHERA
ANDROS ISLAND
CAT ISLAND
SAN SALVADOR
GREAT EXUMA
LONG ISLAND
BAHAMA ISLANDS
AL COMPLEX
Sagua la Grande 5-30 Sept.
Remedios Mid-Sept.
Sagua la Grande 1-5 Sept.
Remedios 5-10 Sept.
Caibarien 1-5 Sept.
Chambas 5-10 Oct.
Esmeralda 5-10 Oct.
EASTERN COMPLEX
Senado 25-30 Sept.
Manati 25-30 Sept.
Chaparra 20-25 Sept.
Holguin Mid-Sept.
Los Angeles 20-25 Sept.
Ciego de Avila 10-15 Oct.
Manzanillo 25-30 Sept.
Santiago 10-15 Oct.
Jiguani 20-25 Sept.
Maldonado 10-15 Oct.
SANTIAGO DE CUBA
U.S. NAVAL BASE
WINDWARD PASSAGE
HAITI
SECRET
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1e

TAB C

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INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF CUBAN ARMS BUILDUP





TOP SECRET

50X1, E.O.13526

(e)

(1f)

TAB D



CUBA U-2 OVERFLIGHTS
FOR AUGUST, 1962



CUBA U-2 OVERFLIGHTS
FOR SEPTEMBER, 1962



CUBA U-2 OVERFLIGHTS
FOR OCTOBER, 1962


WARNING AREA
WARNING AREA
G U L F O
CIA PLANNED ROUTE
ACTUAL ROUTE FLOWN BY SAC
PROB. OPERATIONAL SAM SITE
TARGET AREA
LA HABANA
SANTA FE
PROHIBITED AREA
Boca de Guanabo
CAMPO COLUMBIA
MARIEL NAS
DOMINGO ROSILLO
Cabañas
Ramon
Mariel
Bauta
Santiago de las Vegas
San José de las Lajas
Bejucal
Cayajabos
SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BAÑOS
ARTEMISA
Alquizar
San Felipe
San Antonio de las Vegas
Melena del Sur
Candelaria
RESTRICTED AREA
Guanimar
Camacho
Surgidero de Batabanó
Cayos los Guzmanes
Cayos Las Cayemas
Jejenes
Punta Camegotos
Orozco
Bahia Honda
Pozas
Niagara
2532
Sabanilla
San Cristobal
Taco Taco
La Caballeria
Los Palacios
Herradura
Pilotos
Consolación del Sur
Cayo Inés de Soto
La Esperanza
San Cayetano
Santa Lucia
Matahambre
PINAR DEL RIO
Puerta de Golpe
PINAR DEL RIO
Punta de la Sierra
San Juan y Martinez
San Luis
La Coloma
Media Luna
Punta de Cartas
Dayaniguas
Punta de Carraguao
Cayos del Hambre
Islas de Mangies
Cayo de Dios
CORTES BAY
CAYOS DE SAN FELIPE
Punta de los Barcos
Nueva Gerona
NUEVA GERONA
ISLA DE PINOS
Punta de Afuera
Santa Barbara
COLONEL MARTIN MARRERRO
Santa Fe
Los Indios
Cabo Frances (Cape)
ARCHIPIELAGO DE LOS CANARREOS
Cayo Tablones
Cayos Bocas de Alonzo
14 OCTOBER FLIGH
Punta Gorda (point)
Cayo (Island)
3°E



CUBA U-2 OVERFLIGHT BY SAC
15-22 OCTOBER 62

TOP SECRET