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NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
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21 November 2001

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DR. GROSS: Today's date is 21 November, 2001.
I'm Dr. Charles J. Gross, the Air Guard Historian in the National Guard Bureau, here at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, at Headquarters 1st Air Force and I am resuming our interview with Major General Larry Arnold, the Commander of 1st Air Force, concerning the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September this year and the response of 1st Air Force to those attacks.

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DR. GROSS: That's where I left it off, sir.

MG ARNOLD: Yeah, okay. And then, of course, the first day was extraordinarily hectic. I think I did talk about the fact that we had up to 21 unknowns but we finally were able to shut down. We were on a domestic threat conference with the President and with SECDEF and we were able to determine that the aircraft, the last aircraft that they were concerned about was indeed on the ground in Madrid after we called the US Air headquarters.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And then he got on his airplane and came back to D.C.

By the end of the day, every Air Force base in the country had generated everything they could to put in the air. We did sit down and basically draw out circles on the map where the population centers were, what we thought we should do.

I received very early on a very important designation from CINC NORAD. He assumed that he was the supported CINC, not directed. And he appointed me then as the Joint Force Air Component Commander.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: An important designation.

Along with that the area, the Area Air Defense Commander and the Air Control Authority for the airspace over the continental United States.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: So our relationship then with the FAA became very important. FAA early on had stood down traffic. I think I talked about that.

DR. GROSS: Yes, you did.

MG ARNOLD: Very important. It saved a lot of lives, I believe. I think there was at least one or more other airplanes that would have been hijacked. You know, they found some of the box cutters and things of that nature. I think that probably saved us in the United States. It probably didn't help anything coming in, but certainly within the continental United States.

I talked about the Navy, I believe, being out to sea. They understood all these terms because we in the military have really gotten interested in doctrine over the past five or six years. It's a very important thing.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Again, all of the units standing up on alert and being available, by the second day we had I think the total number of fighters rose to about 303 fighters on alert.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Assigned to Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) or us here. And tankers, we had large numbers of tankers. Just to say that. Now, the tankers are not OPCON'd to us, but they are TACON, which means we have to go through the TACC out at Scott Air Force Base in order to scramble them.

Tony Robertson, GEN. Robertson, a four star, called me up personally and assured me whatever we needed he would get. That was great.

That kind of cooperation exists until this day, period. And we average about 68 to 70 tankers on alert today all the time. So it's a bunch of, a bunch of iron.

AWACS I talked about a little bit I believe.

DR. GROSS: Not too much.

MG ARNOLD: AWACS critical to our operation. We put up three orbits at the time, Washington, New York, and another one out in the Midwest someplace as I recall. And the AWACS' effort

is phenomenal. They have always been over tasked, ever since they've ever existed. Everybody wants them, there's not enough of them. And they have remained above max surge level, almost entirely throughout this anti-terrorism campaign.

They had some relief for a short period of time when we received five NATO AWACS that came over here. And when the United States Customs [Service] with their P-3s with radomes on top, came to the rescue as well. They're stationed out of Corpus Christi, Texas, out of Jacksonville. We actually moved those P-3s up to Grissom [Air Reserve Base, Indiana] so that they were more in the center part of the country.

And I can't tell you how valuable getting the NATO aircraft over here was to help in the AWACS business and getting the P-3s up there flying. In fact, I try to say something about AWACS and about the P-3s, every time I can in public because they don't get enough publicity. And, yet, they are critical to our operation because the interior country, we couldn't see, we couldn't talk.

DR. GROSS: Why not, sir, for the layman like myself.

MG ARNOLD: Well, you know, I told you all of our radars are around the periphery of the country.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And so two things: because the radars that we use are FAA radars around the periphery of the country, we were not tied into the middle because we looked out, not in.

And even if we had access to them, the computer system that we use for command-and-control or for controlling aircraft, for surveillance, as it were, is not robust enough to allow us to hook into those radars.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So that became an immediate goal of how are we going to fix that interior problem for us.

I think I mentioned before that we had worked this ACTD, we came up with this NORAD Contingency Suite it's called, NSC. They use a SOLIPSIS system called Multi-correlations System -- Multi-sensor correlation tracker, MSCT.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: This device allows us to now hook into hundreds of radars. And so we have now installed these MSCTs at all of our sectors, southeast, northeast, and WADS [i.e., Western Air Defense Sector]. In fact, they're still installing the one at WADS right now.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: The others are hooked up and we're very rapidly then being able to bring in the interior radars. A COM is a different problem. We have to hook into the FAA radios. FAA has been very cooperative. They have even built or put in additional radios for us to use. They're assuming they're going to get reimbursed out of this 40 billion dollar fund. They're operating on faith in doing this.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And I think they will be reimbursed. I told them to go ahead. And whether that was a mistake or not, we'll see, but I think they will be reimbursed for that. Some things you've just got to do. That's one thing we've done.

We have got to be able to talk to fighters. We have got to be able -- also, the fighters have to be able to talk to airliners if we're in this business the way we are, which is a strange business.

One of the things that we put in for right away was that our F-15s do not have VHF radios; they only have UHF, two UHF. Our F-16s have UHF and VHF. We put in a Mission Needs Statement to NORAD which NORAD has signed out to ACC which ACC sent up to the Air Force. I'm told there will be a meeting immediately here to install VHF radios into our F-15s. It's already been tested down at the test center.

We had gone to the Guard Bureau and asked them if they had anything. They said they did. They tested it, it worked and I think we're going to get that installed into our aircraft. A great help.

In the meantime, by the way, working with the FAA, we were able to very rapidly -- and when I say very rapidly, within about a week, develop a system we call Big Voice.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We can essentially call a center, an ARTC, an Air Route Training Center of the FAA, and with a telephone line, they will patch us in to the radio frequency that our fighters are using.

And we use it all the time. We've had to use it because that's the only way we can talk to the fighters in certain areas and so typically we can get onto that system and pass a military order if we had to in that operation.

I told you also that -- so we've had primary ways of passing orders, secondary, tertiary. We put air battle managers from the GTACS units around the country, the Theater Air Control Squadrons. The G stands for Ground, but Theater Air Control Squadrons basically do the same thing as AWACS, but on the ground. And we have taken air battle managers, officers from out of those units and we've put three of them at 20 of the 21 ARTCs around the country so that they can pass a military order. And we have the secure telephone, STU-III, right to them, backed up with a hot line directly from the sectors.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So we want to make sure that there's no confusion and that there's no delays. So we have many different ways of being able to talk to people.

We are even funding another concept. And that is using a air combat tactics instrumented pod and putting in that pod a SATCOM radio.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Which will allow us to put this pod on a fighter. We can talk to him on UHF SATCOM anywhere in the world.

And it's a concept that Mike Corbett, who is my Vice Commander, COL. Mike Corbett, thought of and the C2 -- the battle lab over at Hurlburt [Field, Florida] looked at it and they are moving forward on this thing.

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The exciting thing about it is that it would not only solve our problems and probably the largest theater in the world right now is the United States. But it would also solve problems over in CENTCOM. We have aircraft operating up in Afghanistan and you have -- I'm sure their communications are difficult, but it would give the CENTAF commander direct access to any airplane up in the theater with just a pod.

It does more than just transmit a radio signal. It would also -- it transmits back data and that data would show the relationship of that particular aircraft. In this case, we're talking about fighters, in regard to the land, in regard to another airplane.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: It's pretty exciting sort of stuff. But anyway, those are the kinds of things that we're moving out and doing.

In regard to the NORAD contingency suite, the other thing is that while we were able to make that happen very rapidly -- when I say, "We," we were very fortunate to get Steve Callicutt (phonetic) to come down as our DO right after this thing started and our AOC director.

He had been the Vice Commander of the Aerospace Command-and-Control Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center down at Langley. And they're responsible for basically programming all communications and intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance equipment for the entire United States Air Force.

He asked his boss, GENERAL Behler, B-e-h-l-e-r, GENERAL Behler, GENERAL Chandler who was the Air Force ACC/DO, and GENERAL Kenny, LT. GEN. Lesley Kenny up in Electronic Systems Command to come down her. She will be the person who actually does the contracting.

And they came down here and not only agreed to the NORAD contingency suite but to also be on contract by the end of the year for replacement of the ancient Q93 system which we've been trying to get for years and had nothing, no capability to do.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, in a nutshell, that happened very, very rapidly and we're moving forward in that direction.

People. One of the things I talked to you, I alluded to you before about was how do you get people in here when we needed to operate 24 and 7. We needed a much larger operation than we had before. And we were able to get people in here very quickly, but critical to our need was getting a proper personnel division in here. And we finally did. We had people come in here from Gunter [AFS, Alabama], a personnel team came in here, PERSCO team came in here, helped us along with a lady from 12th Air Force Manpower to develop a DRMD, which is a Deployed Readiness Manning Document.

Once we created that manning document which we didn't have before or it was inadequate I should say.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: For our AOC.

Then you can assign UTCs to those positions. And while this is in the, you know, some people think this is trivia, this is critical to the way the system works.

Once we have that, then our logistics people take that information, load it into JOPES and I don't even know what JOP stands for, but it has to do with movement of anything.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: J-O-P-E-S, Joint Operations -- you know, it has to do with getting people and getting equipment. And it is always directed to be used.

Once we loaded JOPES, we basically had MAJCOM authority then to acquire people to help us operate. And then people started flowing in.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: In one day -- in one day, we had 48 people arrive from 8th Air Force. GENERAL Keck (phonetic) is coming in here today to visit with them the day before Thanksgiving, to visit with his people. And, ultimately, you know, Steve Calicutt

even though I got him in here, he fell off the roof of his house and broke both ankles and his wrist --

DR. GROSS: Yes, I heard about that.

MG ARNOLD: And it's going to be non-weight bearing for three months.

DR. GROSS: Bring him in on a stretcher?

MG ARNOLD: Bring him in on a stretcher, I'd love to. I may do that. I may bring him down here in a wheelchair because he's a talented guy.

However, the 8th Air Force Air Operation Group Commander will be here Friday to take over until my new DO gets here towards mid -- well, he's supposed to be here mid-December, but probably won't really be settled down until the first of the year. So I think that has been, from an Air Force perspective, a change in the nature of our business. We were primarily -- I told you before, 85 percent Air National Guard probably with a smattering of active duty Air Force, Navy, Marines, Army, just a few people.

Now we're probably about 50/50. And the way we would like to go -- my vision, anyway, in the future is that our staff -- by the way, when our staff is fully plussed up, when it's tripled in size, we'll still be smaller than any other NAF.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And right now, we're flying more sorties than Northern and Southern Watch combined. I think I've told you that before.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So I don't think we're too large. I think we're getting it right. I think a good mix is somewhere around half-and-half, probably lean a little heavier on the Guard side, about 60 percent Guard, about 40 percent active duty.

We also have 31 Canadians on our staff. They understand this business very well. Most of them have been in it a long time. My Deputy Commander of the Continental United States NORAD region is COLONEL Charlie Buchard (phonetic).

GENERAL Buchard is not -- has not been in the NORAD business. He'd only gotten here in the first part of August.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And this thing occurred, obviously on the 11th of September, but he like any other officer, he's a quick study and he understands everything that is ongoing in this business.

I talked about the "rent-a generals" that we brought in.

DR. GROSS: No, you haven't yet.

MG ARNOLD: One of the things early on I realized was that Charlie Bouchard, myself, and my Vice Commander on the 1st Air Force side, Mike Corbett were going to die. We could not operate the way we were operating.

And we were operating basically as battle managers and so it was kind of like shift work. Well, if there were three of us in there, then you worked 12-hour shifts, you could be off, you know, every few days, one person could get off. But the problem is I couldn't afford to take off at all.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So in order to be on shift work, that was really a problem. So very early on I decided and I'm talking like the first day that we had to bring in some general officers.

And the only place I knew to get them was from the Guard. So I tried to get a hold of GENERAL Doug Moore and GENERAL Higgins, two Guard generals that have been in the Air Defense business before and they were the first two people I called.

GENERAL Moore was at home in California. GENERAL Higgins was -- as all the airplanes were grounded, was in Salt Lake City trying to get from Washington, D.C. to Montana. Because I had already within the first day gotten in a Director of Mobility Forces, we were able to go to the Air Mobility Command and get a Lear Jet to fly out to California, pick up Moore, drop by Salt Lake City -- Higgins never even made it home.

We just picked him up and brought him here.

He had a mandatory retirement date of 4 November. He stayed here without going back home until the 2nd of November. And, in fact, we had a party for him. So he really enjoyed that.

We subsequently got in -- we needed three, really, three general officers to run that and periodically we have had three. Sometimes we have not. So what we basically have done is had GENERAL Bouchard and Mike Corbett kind of pull a day shift in there and then have the other two generals share the night shift sort of thing.

Ideally, we'd like to have three general officers here, put them on 12-hour shifts and they end up being on days for a while, being off for a couple of days, going on nights, being off for a couple of days and back on.

It's kind of a grueling schedule for them; but it is important that someone is in the battle staff in current operations to answer the phone as a general officer and also to make a decision on the types of conference calls that we have to make. It gives a lot of credibility I think also on the other end of the phone when a general officer picks up the phone of what we're doing. So that's why we've done that. And it's worked out exceedingly well.

DR. GROSS: Going back to 11 September for a moment, could you talk about rules of engagement and how they've ebbed and flowed and changed for the Air Defense forces as a result of the terrorist attack?

MG ARNOLD: A lot of people may do this -- it's classified when you talk about rules of engagement. But the rules of engagement for NORAD have always been slightly different from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's standing rules of engagement in that we have always been a little more restrictive in who is allowed to declare a target hostile and to fire.

Because we don't want to make mistakes and without due cause shoot down an innocent civilian. And we've done that over the years. I mean years ago, we had some people shoot down an airplane -- actually didn't shoot it down, I'm sorry.

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They ran into it out over the Atlantic, some airplanes out of Seymour-Johnson just broke away in the fog and we probably shouldn't even have been there chasing this airplane, even though I suspect that it was a drug runner, but they killed all the people on board which probably was not due process.

So during peacetime, normally, the CINC can declare a target hostile. That is further delegated down to the region commander if he cannot get a hold of the CINC and, in an emergency, he can declare a target hostile.

We immediately, when we went to DEFCON 3, we went to transition rules of engagement which allows the

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

As I told you before, the Washington, D.C. area for a short period of time, about a day, became a free-fire zone. That's scary. It allowed the pilot, therefore, to determine that if a airplane was in there flying and was not confirmed friendly, he could shoot it down.

DR. GROSS: And if it didn't respond to his directions to get out of there?

MG ARNOLD: Well, you know, that's the kind of way we are: cautious.

DR. GROSS: Yes.

MG ARNOLD: But basically if that airplane wasn't supposed to be there, we were directed to shoot it down because there was a lot of -- timing was a very critical thing.

That was pulled back very early and then within just a couple of days, they came out with the first of about three series of ROE. And the ROE was not all that dissimilar from the ROE we had before.

We make a lot of it, except for one thing. It was a by name ROE, not by position. So CINC NORAD has always had certain authorities; but if he's out of town on the road, his deputy, the DCINC had that authority or whoever was sitting in the chair at Cheyenne Mountain was delegated that authority. It couldn't be done.

So the SECDEF passed along the authority to shoot down an aircraft and, in this case, we're talking about a civilian aircraft, whether it's a airliner or a Cessna, but a civilian aircraft, could only be done by the CINC and he could delegate that authority to his region commanders, not to be below a two-star rank.

He delegated that authority to me in the continental United States and to Norde Schwartz (phonetic), LT. GEN. Norde Schwartz in Alaska by name.

So what that really means is if I'm gone, if they can't get a hold of me, if my staff cannot get a hold of me and they can't get a hold of the CINC, and they can't get a hold of the SECDEF because all these people are supposed to be in the chain, then they can't do anything.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Even in self-defense. And that is the important issue there. Even in self-defense.

So the way that -- what that caused me to do is to have to increase the level of communications that I had tremendously, at my house, in my car, in my office and I had to be available because we found that the CINC was a very busy guy. A lot of demands on the CINC to be places. And it made it difficult sometimes to get a hold of him in what I would consider a timely manner.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: Like within a just a few minutes.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We can get a hold of him in 15 minutes, but sometimes 15 minutes was frighteningly late.

So the ROE was that in an emergency, I could declare a target hostile and have it shot down if we could not get a hold of the CINC.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Would he have to go up the line normally --

MG ARNOLD: The CINC was told to attempt to get a hold of the National Command Authority which was later equated to the

Secretary of Defense. Not the President directly, but the Secretary of Defense.

So, basically, the chain is the Secretary of Defense has the kill authority. If you can't get a hold of him, it's the CINC. If you can't get a hold of the CINC, it's me here in the continental United States. And I can't delegate it to anybody and it's not positional; it's by name.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Well, how would a pilot in a cockpit authenticate that?

MG ARNOLD: Yeah. Yeah. We established a lot of procedures and basically he has to hear something like this: CINC NORAD or Noble Eagle 1 directs you to -- declares this target, your target, hostile. Clear to fire.

And that is passed to him with an authentication.

DR. GROSS: Like a code or something?

MG ARNOLD: It is. We have these authenticators and it's, you know, you look them up. It's a time, time authenticator. And the time authenticator, you know, you say two digits and -- authentication. Time is this. He looks down at the time. He says, "That's the proper authentication."

Now, what we think will happen is that the pilot will then come back and do his own authentication. He'll say, "Authenticate Tango Charlie," but you've got to look in here -- that will take more time.

DR. GROSS: Yes.

MG ARNOLD: So we know that these decisions have to be made a little early, not at the last minute. We think that airplane will travel at least [redacted] after we begin the clearance to fire. When we give the clearance to fire order -- we've done exercises. And I think in every case they've traveled [redacted] before we could actually have the pilot do this.

Now, the way we talk to the pilot is what I talked to you about before. If the sector -- I don't talk directly to him although now we have the capability to do that.

DR. GROSS: Yes.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

MG ARNOLD: Our procedure is to run this through the sector, so if the -- the controller who is controlling that pilot passes that information to the pilot, if they can. Now, remember, in the interior of the country, our COM is not very good and so, we have to do other things.

We're using -- we've used AWACS. We may have to relay through AWACS. We put the air battle managers into these 20 ARTCs --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- solely to be able to pass a military order; declare target hostile, cleared to fire. And they understand that. It's an expensive thing to do. We were tying up -- you know, nearly 70 people out there --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- in these centers, doing this job, but it's important.

And on top of that, just in case we can't do it, this big voice that I talked about --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- can pick it up and transmit the -- declare hostile, cleared to fire, clearance is, and we can talk to the pilots and do that. So, we -- thank God we haven't had to do it. We've done it in exercises and it works every way.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: You know, we've had to do it every -- in every way, by the way.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: The one I feel the best about is the -- having air battle managers in the -- right there in the ARTCs, talking over the FAA frequencies. It works extraordinarily well.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm. I mean, you haven't even come close to having to give that kind of order since 11 September, I --

MG ARNOLD: No.

DR. GROSS: -- assume, from what you've said?

MG ARNOLD: No. I'm shaking my head no.

DR. GROSS: Yeah, okay. Let's see, backing up a little bit to 11 September, this process of generating all these fighter squadrons. I mean, how did that -- did people call in? I mean, did they --

MG ARNOLD: The President directed --

DR. GROSS: -- just come up and say, "Hey, I'm here?"

MG ARNOLD: The President directed the military to generate all --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: -- all their combat capability. But in the meantime, we had started early. I mean, while that United 93 was flying around, the Northeast Air Defense Sector Commander got on the telephone and he called Detroit and said, "What have you got?" He called Toledo and said, "Get some airplanes airborne if you can." He called Syracuse, New York, he said "Get some air" - - these were not part of the NORAD operation.

DR. GROSS: Yeah. These were all Guard units, I believe.

MG ARNOLD: Guard units. Well, that's because there are only Guard units up in the Northern part of the United States.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: There are no fighter units in the Northern part of the United States. There are no Air Force units in New York State --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- you know, for example. No active duty Air Force at all in New York and no fighters in the entire Northern part of the United States except for out in Idaho --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- as you might know. So -- and as those units came up, our sector commanders called them and we rolled them in and under our operational control and --

DR. GROSS: These guys didn't have any orders --

MG ARNOLD: They didn't have --

DR. GROSS: -- pieces of paper, nothing?

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MG ARNOLD: They didn't have -- you know, normally, you have to have a deployment order which -- which assigns you to -- gives you OPCON to NORAD or whatever.

It was all verbal and that never became a problem until about -- I think it was about day 3 when we came down off orbit and I suddenly realized that we could not get to some of our orbits in a timely manner. That timely manner was determined to be 20 minutes.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: If you couldn't get there in 20 minutes, then what good were you?

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: And we were -- we -- we worked with the NORAD staff to make that a criteria. It became a criteria given to us by NORAD, but it was one that we thought was wise. Normally, you can have up to 15 minutes to get airborne. What we said was, "Well, if we can get airborne in 10 minutes and at .95 mach -- get there in another 10 minutes, that's probably about the best we can do."

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We can't tell somebody we can do better than that and if it takes us longer than that, we become irrelevant.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

DR. GROSS: So, we started looking at that. It forced us to do some things. First place -- the most difficult place I had -- and again, this is for history and -- you know, I'm talking on the record here, but I'm not anxious for some of this stuff to -- to come out with names, but first thing I did was, I said, "I need to have fighters on the ground in Atlanta, because I can't get to Atlanta."

Nearest fighters were at Eglin [AFB, Florida] and at Tyndall --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- and at Shaw [AFB, South Carolina], but not close to Atlanta. And so, I directed the Eglin wing, 33rd

Fighter Wing, to deploy four airplanes to Dobbins Air -- Air Force Reserve Base and go on alert. Now, I didn't just do this. We coordinated through the CAT team up at Langley.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: The wing commander over there was busting his hump trying to get his airplanes ready to go. Air Mobility Command is moving on the C-17 over there. I tried to call the -- the ACC/DO twice and he didn't return my phone call. And I don't know if he didn't get the message or whatever. And I tried to call the ACC Commander -- Acting Commander once and he didn't return my phone call, so this thing is just going down.

I did eventually talk to the ACC/ADO, Assistant D.O. And he knew about it, but I got a blistering phone call the next day. The C-17 is sitting on the ramp at Eglin. They're loading the damn thing and GENERAL Cooke called me up and just chewed my ass --

DR. GROSS: Uh-huh.

MG ARNOLD: -- about, what the hell was I doing moving his airplanes. Well, hell, I assumed I had OPCON with those airplanes.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And not only that, I had done everything I could to try to coordinate it, but I couldn't wait --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: -- for these guys to get around to make -- returning my phone call. I had to get those airplanes in place.

And he said, "You don't have OPCON, you don't -- probably don't even have TACON and there's no way in hell those airplanes are going to go. They're not your resources."

Well, everything in the world had been my resource up until that moment. He said, "You've got to have a deployment order." Everything else we had had was a verbal deployment -- deployment order.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And so, after all was said and done, I hung up the phone and I sat there and I said, "I got an airplane on

the ramp, C-17. I don't have any coverage in Atlanta. I'm still screwed here." So, I called him back, said, "GENERAL Cook, I apologize to you for my sins," you know, in -- in so many words. And I did. I was very contrite.

But I said, "We still need them at Dobbins," and he said, "Well, I don't think you're going to get them. I've got to call Jumper," who by now -- now is the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Hours went by and finally, my DERMOP 4 (phonetic) came to me and -- "You know, by the way, Cooke said, 'I'll have -- I'll have ACC/DO call you with the final word.'" Well, hours went by and I hadn't heard a thing. DERMOP 4 came to me and said, "If we don't move that C-17 in the next six hours, it's going to be recalled."

And of course, they were getting ready to kick off Enduring Freedom and start positioning for it and he said, "You're probably not going to see it back there again." So, I finally called up the -- the DO at ACC and he said he hadn't heard anything and he said the same thing, "I don't think you're going to get them up there," and then I heard his phone ring and he didn't have a clicker and -- you know, came back and he finally said, "Okay." He said, "You got approval form to go and they're OPCONed to you."

So, once you get OPCON, OPCON means you can move them wherever you need them, so -- but it was a good lesson for me because even though I had been in the command and control business for a while, this whole idea of having a deployment order is -- is the essential way that you do business.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, we were able to finally coordinate a deployment order for all of our forces and we released lots of forces. We had way --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- too much force structure at the time. And so, it was a good lesson and -- for me and there had been a lot of misinformation. I later talked to GEN Cooke about it; not

chuckling, but just explaining and on -- on this issue and his final words to me were, "You know, if -- after this thing -- whole thing is over, we're always going to have these events. If we can look each other in the eye at the bar and share a whiskey" --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- "then we've done it okay."

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: And I think he's right.

DR. GROSS: Yeah. Well, I was saying from your discussion, then, that you didn't have those -- that kind of problem with the OPCON for other Air Force units?

MG ARNOLD: Well, I must admit --

DR. GROSS: The Air Guard units?

MG ARNOLD: -- that I was -- I was suspicious. I was suspicious at the time that -- no, the -- the answer is, you're absolutely right, because we were moving -- we were moving aircraft into Minneapolis, Minnesota and there were Guard assets and nobody was challenging us on that. And they were not units at the time that were assigned to First Air Force.

But it was just as applicable. Yeah, there -- there was more concern about -- at Dobbins because -- because -- then there were about the Guard units, I suppose. But it was just as applicable. You still needed to have a deployment order in order to be able to move these airplanes, so we learned how to do it correctly. Should have known already, but --

DR. GROSS: And quickly?

MG ARNOLD: And quickly. And we got verbal orders to do these things, worked very closely. I mean, the ACC would go out of their way to work with Joint Forces Command because theoretically, we should make the request to the CINC. The CINC has to go to the JCS. JCS then directs -- they direct Joint Forces Command to prepare this thing. But everybody gets a chop.

So, you know, you have a deployment order being built and ACC can say, "I don't concur with that." So, the important

thing is that you really need to get it greased before the deployment order is built so it'll float quickly.

But the -- we ended up with multiple deployment orders changing and sometimes, by the -- before we would get the next one, we needed to change things more so we would have another one going in. And they're always out of cycle coming in and --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: -- it was -- it was a problem for us, but we were able to get the very important ones fixed verbally.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And we would -- we would move people or -- we didn't move a whole lot of people, but we would either get them assigned to us or -- or deployed. Because the first deployment order just -- you know, it looked great.

We realized that we had force structure sometimes in places where we really didn't want it and other -- and other places where we needed it. So, we were able to get all that done without too much -- too much hassle, but it -- it left me with -- with a few wakeful hours during the course of the night.

DR. GROSS: I bet, I bet. How long did it take you all to basically revamp this Air Defense System where you had -- you're trying to cover the interior of the country with a COM and radar and CAPS and -- and your orientation is really different than it was before. I'm sure you weren't ever really satisfied completely with that, but how long did that process of sorts --

MG ARNOLD: Well, it's --

DR. GROSS: -- revamping this whole system (inaudible)

MG ARNOLD: It's still -- it's still ongoing.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: We are getting real close to picking up all the radars. COM is -- is the most difficult thing. One of the things that -- about COM is we need to buy radios and there has been a moratorium on buying any more radios until this joint -- there's a -- there's a -- I'll have to get you a name on it. I can't think of it. A joint-type radio that's been directed -- that that is the radio you will buy.

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DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Hell, it -- they don't exist and they're not going to exist for six years.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: But we needed a lot of radios.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, we had to go out and get waivers in order to buy radios or just use some radios that we've been -- been able to acquire --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- from the FAA. One of the most unique things that I think I did mention was that the Southeast sector had some NCOs that were very thoughtful about this. NCOs don't theorize and try to get deployment orders. They just go out and do things, you know.

They took a big truck, threw a bunch of telephone poles on the back of the thing, and had a truck full of FAA radios that they had gotten from some place and they drove up to Dobbins Air Force Base and up to Warner Robbins Air Force Base and to Air National Guard facilities throughout the Southeast and essentially -- I think they told the commanders -- they were supposed to tell the commanders -- they dug a hole, put up a telephone pole with a radio on top of it and we suddenly could talk to fighters.

DR. GROSS: Jesus.

MG ARNOLD: And it just happened. This was not a program. It just happened.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And our other sectors did not necessarily do that. We finally saw we had a big problem up in the Detroit area --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- with lack of COMs. And finally, we did the same thing up there at Selfridge ([ANG Base, Michigan]). We just put a big radio or a radio up on top of a telephone pole and

we solved the communications problem. You had to be on -- you know, a very limited number of frequencies --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- that you could be on, but it worked. But that problem is being resolved. We solved the problem that we -- we solved the issue that we were going to hook up for the interior radars, that we were going to have this NORAD contingency suite, which allowed us to hook up the interior radars and that we were going to have the COM within the first two weeks.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: But getting it all done just takes a little while and we have moved -- I still think, you know, here we are just about 10 weeks into this operation and phenomenally, we have -- we're -- we will have complete radar coverage very soon, to the point that I think we could not use E.O. 13526, section 1.4(g) moves, for example --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- in a lot of places. But politically, I'm not so sure that we're going to be able to stop

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(g)

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: They really want warning. They do not take active measures. They take more passive measures, I think.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: They want to make sure that they get the E.O. 13526, section 1.4(g) the threat area --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- into a safe location and that's their concept of operation. For us, we -- we think in terms of the AWACS not only being able to detect, but more importantly, that they would be able to link that picture back to us for situational awareness and to be able to provide that information to a fighter that's airborne.

Because the FAA radars all over the country are pretty good and so, they're going to see the -- and they will see the

target first as a target of interest, because we don't necessarily know.

You got a AWACS sitting up there, you can look at all this traffic out there, but if the FAA is controlling that and suddenly, they've got traffic that is not doing what it is supposed to do, then they have to get to the AWACS or to us and say, "This -- look, this target is the one we want you to look at."

AWACS alone, without FAA, is not very effective, so we have to work very close with the FAA --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- to do that and we have, at the highest levels. I talked to the Director of Traffic Control up at -- Mr. Jeff Griffith and we worked -- we worked well with him, not just -- E.O. 13526, section 1.4(g) but we created temporary restricted areas. We enlarged Class-B air space that's over cities that usually looks like an inverted wedding cake --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- so that you can fly light airplanes way down low.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: The higher you get, the -- then you have to be -- have an instrument or IFR clearance and you have to have transponders. Well, we lowered that cylinder right to the ground and then expanded it, made it bigger --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- especially over Washington, D.C. and New York. It still is that way.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We're just now getting to the point where we're going to come back in and we did that for security reasons.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And I talked to -- to Jeff quite a bit on the phone. They were, at one time, going to allow general aviation to start flying immediately again and they read me a press release. They said, you know, it's kind of "Thank you very

much for your interest in national defense, here's what we're going to do."

And I just, in a calm way -- I think a calm way, I said, "Well, you know, Jeff, I understand what your position is, but I think what you're doing is -- is a threat to the national defense of the United States."

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And guess what? They didn't do it.

DR. GROSS: Yeah, good, good.

MG ARNOLD: So, we have cooperated --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- with them and a pleasure to work with -- with the FAA. For example, in the space shuttle business, we're -- I've got to go to a meeting over at our place here in -- in about a half hour --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- to cover the shuttle launch, but --

(End of Side A.)

DR. GROSS: All right, we're good.

MG ARNOLD: We have to create these temporary no-fly zones and they're big. I mean, they're big for the FAA, a 40-mile cylinder, you know.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, that's what we're building around the space shuttle during the launch windows, which would basically be about 16 hours before they launch. We'll go up on alert, we'll go up on CAP, but the only aircraft that will be allowed to penetrate that 40-mile cylinder will be passenger aircraft that are under the direct control of FAA --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- going into -- into Orlando, probably or -- or going overhead. We have a lot of confidence -- I think I did talk about this before -- in the point of departure security, as we should.

But we exclude some of those other aircraft that could be, again, large aircraft, but if they do not have the same kind

of point of departure security, then they're not going to be allowed into that cylinder -- into that, so we can't afford that for basically --

DR. GROSS: FedEx or somebody in the --

MG ARNOLD: Pardon me?

DR. GROSS: FedEx or (inaudible) --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

MG ARNOLD: Well, FedEx has it, you think?

DR. GROSS: Yeah, yeah.

MG ARNOLD: But there are other aircraft that don't have that kind of capability --

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: -- so we won't let them in.

DR. GROSS: Okay. A question that arose, and we may have discussed it briefly before was, during -- particularly, during the 11th and since then, there's so much that you could defend and you don't have the resources --

MG ARNOLD: Mm-hmm.

DR. GROSS: -- to defend everything here in the U.S. I mean, you -- you know, how did you determine or who determined and how did that change --

MG ARNOLD: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: -- what was to be defended?

MG ARNOLD: Again, I said we just kind of drew circles around the place. We changed it around a little bit, added one site. We've actually been flying over that site. I think it was -- it was almost an oversight, as it were, that we did not list it as a defended -- as an orbit area and it was over the Dallas/Fort Worth area. And we -- we just later identified that as a CAP.

Eventually, probably a month after this thing began, everybody in the world, of course, is putting in, "You got to come defend me," and -- and we were just told, "No, no, no." Everybody has to send their request through their service up to the JCS. JCS will make a determination.

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Well, finally, we received a National Security Council list of cities and other sites --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- that they thought were priority. The list of cities, to the most part, resembled our cities --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- but they left off a few, which I didn't understand. They left off Seattle, Dallas/Fort Worth, one of the largest cities in the country --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- as you can imagine. But they had some places on there that we didn't even think about that we should have, I suppose, like Las Vegas, Orlando.

And I think the thought was that these are popular vacation places and there might be a lot of people there. And so, we had to adapt a little bit and we're still in the planning stages of adapting to that, because we weren't directed to do anything specifically.

The other thing that they directed us to do was to -- to develop a plan to protect nuclear power plants and some nuclear labs --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- around the country. And we did that and eventually -- now, this is -- this is classified. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(f) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] And we did that for about seven days.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: It was a long time, 24 hours a day. And while we were doing that, I can tell you we were not positioned to be able to defend all the cities.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: It was kind of an either/or process. It is still sort of an either/or process. So, we're still working that with NORAD as we go down this road. You can't guard everything.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: There are chemical sites, you know, where the Army has stored the chemical weapons they're trying to destroy and those things are very -- you know, it could be high-profile targets --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- so we're concerned about that. But the way that the system is supposed to work is that the individuals will send their -- their -- their priority up to their MAJCOM in a service and then they will send it up to the joint staff and the joint staff then will go to CINC and tell the CINC, "This is your defended asset list that I want you to defend."

And that's kind of how it works, but we can't defend everything, so we have to do this with broad-area defense rather than point defense for specific things. The Navy's interested in their submarine pens.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: Army's interested in chemical sites. NASA is interested in the space shuttle, as they should. Civilian populations are concerned about the civilian population.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Nuclear -- Department of Energy is concerned about nuclear power plants and labs.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: You -- we need to put some Army assets on the ground as well and so far, that's been denied.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We have plans to use patriot and to use Avenger (phonetic) missile systems, but we have not been allowed to actually incorporate those into ROE; great fear that we would not be able to have an adequate ROE to prevent us from shooting down an airplane by mistake.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And --

DR. GROSS: Because your Army -- you couldn't be up there eyeballing the plane and --

MG ARNOLD: No, I don't -- no, I feel very confident. We do this all the time, all over the world. We integrate Air Defense -- Army defense artillery into the order of battle, but we have not had the very specific ROE that we've had here, very limited ROE.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We believe we've developed concepts of operations of how we can include that in there. We think we could do it, but it would be quick. It would -- it would happen very quick and if you make a mistake, I mean, you can't pull that -- once you pull that trigger, it's gone, you know.

DR. GROSS: Yeah, yeah.

MG ARNOLD: So --

DR. GROSS: Could I ask you, just --

MG ARNOLD: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: -- going back, for my own clarification, initially, within the first hours of the first days --

MG ARNOLD: Mm-hmm.

DR. GROSS: -- it seems like the emphasis was on defending Washington, New York, and other population centers. Now --

MG ARNOLD: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: How was that -- I mean, did you make that decision? Somebody else, some combination? How did that -- you know, initially come to be?

MG ARNOLD: Well, because we were initially up over Washington and New York, you know, we have the -- the F-15s from -- from Otis. They were there in New York. We left them there.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: And we had the F-16s out of Langley, then we left them there. Then it became apparent to me that we were going to have to keep them on CAP and we developed a plan and I said, "We've got to develop -- we need to get aircraft up over these other cities" --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- "in case something occurs." And -- and so, we did.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We just developed a plan, sent it up to the CINC, CINC said, "Yay verily," sent it up to the SECDEF. SECDEF said, "Looks good to me," and that became the plan.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And a couple days later, the SECDEF then directed the CINC to -- said, "I want to -- I want to return, get us -- return back to the civilian aviation. We've got to do that." And he was concerned, that with all these fighters airborne, that we might interfere somehow with civil aviation. You know, we fly every day with civil aviation. We don't interfere.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We stood down --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: I wasn't sure at the time that that was the right thing to do, but we were directed to do it by the SECDEF. It was the right thing to do, but we are still, of course, on orbit over New York and Washington, D.C. right now.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: I think we will probably find ourselves over the next week or two, if no other events occur, in a position to relook at the -- continuing those CAPs over New York and Washington, D.C.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: I don't know that we'll be there all the time. We may be up there randomly.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Now, when we came down off of Washington and -- I mean, everywhere else but Washington and New York, we were told originally, "Put up random CAPs." And then we got -- started getting phone calls, "How come you aren't guarding the ball games (inaudible)?"

So, our random CAPs are based on more than just being random. We look at events that are occurring on the -- you know, ball games are a big one. A lot of people there.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We cover them. There's some other very sensitive things that we do that I won't even talk about here, but --

DR. GROSS: I understand.

MG ARNOLD: -- but they -- we're directed for us to look at certain things. And we look at these every day --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- and we make sure we have random CAPs to cover these events that we're directed to look at. And then, of course, in the middle of all this, the White House directed us to go up over the seven sites I talked about before for a long period of time and then over Chicago and Detroit. We did that -- Chicago and Detroit for about 20 days starting on the first of November --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- without let-up and then we were just told to stand down. We have no visibility on the intel or anything why that was driven.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: But it was driven.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: And I think we'll continue to fly random CAPs around the country, but we may come down off of some of the CAPs on a continuing basis.

DR. GROSS: In your view, what are the long-term or the medium-term implications of Noble Eagle for Air Defense?

MG ARNOLD: I think we'll be susceptible to terrorist attacks from the air, probably in the same way that they occurred on the 11th of September, because terrorists know they can do that.

So, I believe that we will maintain the capability to defend against that for the foreseeable future. It'll be hard

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for us to forget the 11th of September. Could be that a terrorist will decide that he'll never do that again, so I think that we'll do that. So, Air Defense, as we know it, will be much more robust than the seven sites that we had prior.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: That's my belief. I think it should be that way, anyway. But I think we need to turn our focus, in addition to looking internally -- is to still look at the capability of being attacked by cruise missile-type targets and maybe seeing that -- like, if there's a better way to do this from inside the country, you ought to be able to do it.

So, our focus then will need to be, in addition to looking interior of the country, we still have a very limited capability of looking outside the country. Because the radars that we're using are good for medium altitude along the coast, but not for low altitude.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Interior, we're pulling in all the radars we need to be able to see low.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We don't have places -- you can't put radars out over the ocean, you know, unless they are on a ship.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, we're going to have to solve that problem. You can use aerostats.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We do that along the Gulf Coast and that allows us to see down low. There are other systems being developed. You know, space-based radar may be pushed up, a very expensive program. Technology is not there yet to do broad-area surveillance from satellites. Bandwidth is too large --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- to be able to do that. But we will develop that technology, but it's -- it's years away from doing that. But we need to continue to develop those kinds of capabilities if we're truly going to have the -- have true air

sovereignty and air defense of this country, because somebody is going to figure out a way to -- to find a weakness and attack us.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And we need to be prepared to do -- to defend against it.

DR. GROSS: It means more force structure and more personnel?

MG ARNOLD: It'll require more force structure, but not a lot more.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: I think our units, for example, that are pulling alert will continue to pull alert. We need to work towards not 15 PAA aircraft, as we have now, as we've dwindled down to that. We need to go back to 18 PAA aircraft.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Some people are afraid of that, because they're afraid we'll have to close units in order to get to 18.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: I believe, rightfully or wrongly, that we have cut way too much.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, we need more force structure to be able to do this and so, it should not be at the expense of somebody else, that we need to -- if you got to do more, you need to have more force structure to do it.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, that -- that would be my approach.

DR. GROSS: There's been some talk that this should be a total force approach, not primarily a Guard mission in --

MG ARNOLD: Yeah.

DR. GROSS: -- the future.

MG ARNOLD: It is. It is. I mean, right now, we have -- Langley is flying 24-hour CAP over Washington, D.C. I mean, the 1st Fighter Wing is doing that alone.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We have two CAPs over Washington. They're doing one CAP alone. They're been trading off with Seymour-Johnson [AFB, North Carolina] to some degree.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: That's a big effort on their part. They've done -- and they've done it without whining, I guarantee you.

Shaw is on alert. They've been helping us, also, with the other CAP up in Washington, D.C. and it's a long ways from Shaw to --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- to Washington, D.C. I told you before about the CAP at Dobbins when -- from Eglin. They have also helped us as -- when we were on CAP for 24 hours a day up at Detroit, we didn't have anybody to help us up there, but Selfridge -- an Air National Guard unit with 15 airplanes doing all that CAP in one month. They flew half of their yearly flying time.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: You know, they get reimbursed for that flying time, but the impact -- long-term impact on that unit is significant.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, we have used the airplanes on alert -- on 30-minute alert in Atlanta to go up and cover the CAPs up at Selfridge.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: It's a long haul. They do that. Cannon -- Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico has been a pulling alert at Carswell. When we had to go up on these seven additional CAPs, Cannon came up not on alert, but started flying out of Cannon Air Force Base to give us coverage over some of the labs out in New Mexico --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- that we needed coverage from. And of course, Hill Air Force Base has been pulling our alert attachment

over at Travis. That is, by the way, from a facility perspective, the worst bare-based operation that we have.

DR. GROSS: Travis? Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: Travis, you wouldn't think so, but it is.

DR. GROSS: No.

MG ARNOLD: It's not designed for fighters. It's a big Air Mobility Command base and we had terrible facilities for the crews to live in. There were no separate -- you know, they were bunk beds. The -- the ladies were in the same bunks with the guys. I mean, not in the same bed, but I mean -- you know, one in one bunk, one in the same room, having to share toilet facilities.

The toilet facilities were abysmal. They had -- ground water was collected in open containers. I mean, it was disgusting --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- and we've got that rectified.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And the only way we got it rectified is, I took my IG and -- and my safety officer and put them on the road. They went around to all the non-traditional bases, took pictures and interviewed the people and came back to me and said, "We need to get these things fixed."

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And we had worked with the MAJCOMS in order to get them fixed.

DR. GROSS: What are the prospects now that this system is going to be larger, total force and -- you know, an additive kind of thing rather than, "Wow, we've got to take the money out of here and the money -- and the people out of there and" -- you know, what's your offset kind of thinking?

MG ARNOLD: There's no offset.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: Hopefully, most of the things -- we had to make initial purchases will come out of the emergency \$40,000,000,000 --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- budget that Congress put out there. And the Air Force is going to have to be given a higher amount -- you know, a larger amount of money. That's just plain and simple, because there's nothing to offset against. We're -- we haven't -- we collect contingencies and we continue to do them.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: You know, we -- how long have we been in Southern and Northern Watch? Ten years.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: You know, 10 years and we are still there. We're still in Iceland. Probably don't need to be in Iceland.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: I think we're going to come out of this campaign. This counter-terrorism, if it did one thing or if it does one thing, and I think it will -- once and for all eradicate the differences between Russia and the United States from the military thinking.

I think those of us from the military -- yeah, we always gave lip service to "The Cold War is over," but the truth of the matter is we responded to Soviet -- not Soviet, but Russian long-range aviation. They put their bombers up on the Northern tier into Tixie (phonetic), which is up on the Arctic Ocean, and into Annadeer (phonetic) out west.

We positioned fighters to respond to those up in Alaska. I think that will stop. I think that will come to an end.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And I think our focus on the former Soviet Union, which has long been gone, but some of the capabilities remain with Russia -- will be eradicated.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm. According to some newspaper accounts, Air Guard units are flying some 80 percent of the Air Defense missions now and it's -- you know, it's --

MG ARNOLD: Maybe 80 percent of the locations, but they're not flying probably 80 percent of the -- of the missions.

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It's where they're located. You know, if you don't have a unit -- there are no Air Force fighter units, as I said before, in New York, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Montana.

You want to get further south? Well, I think I said Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa -- there aren't any.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Out West, you have -- at Salt Lake City and then you got Nellis, you know, down in Nevada and Mountain Home up in Idaho. But other than that, the state of Washington, state of Oregon, name a fighter unit up there. There aren't any.

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: So, we put people on alert where they are.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: The -- the intent is total force. We're using the total force in the Southeast and in the west. We're using it where the people are located --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- without regard to whether they're Guard or Active Duty.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm. What impact, though, is this having on those units in the Northeast that are heavily tasked, particularly (inaudible) --

MG ARNOLD: Yeah. Well, it's having a impact. What I want to -- what I don't want to happen is -- is to have dedicated Air Defense Units. I would like us to still be able to train for worldwide deployable missions and then be tasked to go to northern and southern watch if they continue Enduring Freedom, if necessary, and Noble Eagle.

So, the impact is that we want Noble Eagle to become a contingency, then, that is tasked from the Air Expeditionary Force Center. That's easier to say than it is to do.

DR. GROSS: Why that, sir?

MG ARNOLD: It's because we were fully tasked before.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: I think the first go-around will look ugly. We'll probably end up tasking a lot of Guard units that were deployed -- scheduled to deploy overseas to do this mission.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And it'll look ugly if we continue to fly the CAPs up over --

DR. GROSS: Yeah.

MG ARNOLD: -- the New York area. But in the future, after we go through the Cycle-1 -- the reason it's going to look ugly is we're coming up on AEF 9 and 10, which are almost entirely Guard.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And that is where we are right now coming up in December.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We are going to use some of that Guard force structure to do Noble Eagle.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: I'm -- ACC would like to do that. We -- we're trying to present a different plan, but if you're going to be included -- if you're going to include Noble Eagle in the AEF tasking, somebody's got to do it.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And it just so happens that 9 and 10 that are due to start in December are almost exclusively Guard and Reserve.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: So, it's going to look ugly --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- from a Guard perspective, but if it -- if, in the next cycle, it is backfilled with Active Duty, as it should be --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- then we're back to normal.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm. Where do you stand on the various homeland security proposals that have been floating around the country and the role --

MG ARNOLD: I'm in favor of them.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: Okay.

DR. GROSS: And the role that the Guard and First Air Force --

MG ARNOLD: Yep.

DR. GROSS: -- should play in that.

MG ARNOLD: Yep. The Guard should be involved in anything that has to do with homeland security, but not exclusively, is what I -- I think the most interesting thing to me is the idea of having a homeland CINC.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: This -- this homeland security cabinet position is interesting with Gov. [Tom] Ridge --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- taking over that. But that's not a military organization. We may have to coordinate our military in order to support that operation.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: We will. But I think it is time we've long needed a CINC --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- for the United States. I personally think that and I'm prejudiced in this matter. I personally think it ought to be CINC NORAD. And you'll say, "Well, he doesn't have any maritime or Army components."

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Well, he can learn --

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: -- how to do that. The other candidate for that is probably Joint Forces Command, which -- a lot of experience in Army and -- and maritime, no experience in -- in Air Defense. Plus, we already have a treaty with Canada with

NORAD, so I think NORAD is going to continue to exist as NORAD, at least for the near future.

So, I would hope that that occurs.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: And when that does occur, it will solve some of the problems we have right now. Joint Forces Command, for example, also wears SACLANT. He's a Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic, so he owns all the coastal waters on the Atlantic, but he doesn't own the coastal waters on the Pacific.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Anything on the Pacific belongs to PACAF and including -- the Pacific Fleet is located not only at Pearl Harbor; it's located at San Diego.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: You know, it's the Third Fleet over there. They work for PACAF and PACOM, I should say PACOM --

DR. GROSS: PACOM, right, okay.

MG ARNOLD: PACOM. If we have a CINCDOM) of the Americas, we would probably include the coastal waters out to 200 miles on either side and probably bring in Alaska into that, so Alaska would no longer be part of PACOM.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: It would be part of this CINCDOM) of the Americas. Guys, I got to go.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Well, thank you very much.

MG ARNOLD: I'll get with you again.

(The interview was concluded.)

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