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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 1, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SUSAN E. RICE *SR*  
FROM: SHAWN MCCORMICK *SM*  
SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Interagency on Eastern  
Zaire, Saturday, November 2, 1996, 9:30 a.m.



READING TIME

Since most people will only receive the meeting package Saturday morning, you may want to provide ten minutes at the start of the meeting for people to read the Issues Paper at Tab B.

SITREP

Ask CIA to provide assessment of the military/humanitarian situation in eastern Zaire, likely humanitarian requirements, status of Americans and other ex-patriots in Goma and Bukavu, and future prospects.

ISSUES FOR DECISION


1. Approval of Push-Pull Strategy

UNHCR now accepts that closed camps should not be reconstituted and a policy of aggressive repatriation must begin. Zaire refuses to allow new camps to be established further inland and conditions in Rwanda do permit the refugees to return home. Only repatriation can avert a larger humanitarian disaster and promote long-term stability.

Ogata is focusing on "pull" factors such as prepositioning food and supplies in Rwanda, utilizing testimonials, leaflet airdrops and other measures to convince refugees to repatriate. We have tried much of this for the last two years with virtually no success. Under her concept, the refugees would transit a humanitarian corridor manned by Zairian troops or 5,000 international troops that do not and will not exist. What is missing is an effective pull strategy, possibly including the use

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Classified by: McCormick, Shawn  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: 1.6, X6



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INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)  
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-040, document no. 33  
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 18, 2014

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of armed elements, to encourage repatriation through this humanitarian corridor.

NSC staff unanimously support the "pull" elements, including an aggressive public information campaign in Mugunga camp to encourage repatriation, establishment by UNHCR of humanitarian corridors inside Zaire and Rwanda to protect refugees, significantly increasing UNHCR and other international resources and personnel inside Rwanda, and urging Rwanda to take its own steps to encourage repatriation.

On the "push" side, all concerned NSC staff agree on a psyops campaign, but we are split whether to use Zairian government troops, Zairian Tutsi forces or outside troops, perhaps from Ethiopia. Soderberg, Schwartz and McCormick favor, in the first instance, using Zairian forces to lead a "push" strategy. Rice favors using Zairian Tutsi forces, or as a fallback position also supported by Soderberg and McCormick outside forces, possibly from Ethiopia to effect the "push." Rice feels strongly that to use undisciplined and corrupt Zairian troops would certainly result in people being killed.

Schwartz is also concerned that, while we do not want to re-establish camps at the border, we will need an assistance strategy for Zaire - even if repatriation works. This is because repatriation is not likely to occur as quickly as we would like. We face the specter of tens of thousands of women and children suffering badly as they await fruition of our "strategy." Schwartz would avoid public statements of our bottom line until after we have consulted with UNHCR. Doing so would risk us assuming responsibilities (and blames for failures) that should be those of the international community. Finally, Schwartz urges dispatch of a team to Geneva this weekend and elements onward to Kigali.

**Goal:** Gain approval of the psyops campaign and "pull" elements as central tenets of a U.S. strategy to promote repatriation. Discuss "push" options of using Zairian government forces, Zairian Tutsis, or an outside force, possibly Ethiopia in a "push" strategy. Gain approval to dispatch Eric Schwartz and State official to Geneva this evening to work with UNHCR in Geneva and key European capitals beginning Monday to arrive at an aggressive repatriation plan.

## 2. Take Steps to Prepare for Humanitarian Crisis

With only 500,000 or so refugees in camps, more than 500,000 others are in transit to unknown destinations. Both groups will be in need of significant humanitarian assistance within a matter of days. Food and water needs are acute, and sanitation could

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become an even more pressing problem as large numbers of refugees congregate at Mugunga camp west of Goma. International relief agencies can provide some of the needs, but the U.S. and others will likely be called upon to fill the gaps. Our problem is that neither we nor UNHCR know what those gaps are and no effective planning is taking place.

Goal: Gain agreement to dispatch a technical team this weekend (humanitarian experts, military planner/logistician) to Geneva to assess likely gaps in humanitarian crisis planning. Gain agreement to send a CDC water expert to the region, issue a warning order/consider deploying evacuation team to Entebbe, establish 24-hour interagency Task Force at State, dispatch an experienced US humanitarian coordinator to Kigali to work with UNHCR, and press State to allow the DART team now in Rwanda access to Eastern Zaire.

### 3. Approve Diplomatic Strategy

Regional leaders will hold their first summit since the latest crisis in Eastern Zaire next Tuesday in Nairobi. This is an important opportunity to press leaders toward a cease-fire and other necessary agreements. However, it is unclear if Zairian Prime Minister Kengo, his Defense Minister along with Rwanda VP/Defense Minister Kagame will attend. It is important the U.S. push for all of them to attend and to send a high-level official (Moose) to help broker an agreement. State opposes this and wants to send its Central Africa division director (too low level).

Efforts by Zairians to deny Zairian Tutsis their citizens, rights and property is an important reason for the current instability in Eastern Zaire. Affirmation of their rights and assurances of no persecution is critical if the conflict and Rwandan support to the Tutsis is to cease.

Adequate supplies of international humanitarian assistance are in the region, but it cannot be transshipped due to fighting which has closed road access from Uganda and the airports in Goma and Bukavu. The only available route is overland via Rwanda, but the Kigali government is not allowing supplies to pass.

Goal: Gain agreement to work with European allied to encourage Zairian Prime Minister Kengo, his Defense Minister and Rwandan Vice President/Defense Minister Kagame to attend regional summit in Nairobi on November 5. Gain agreement to dispatch A/S Moose from Paris to work the margins of the summit. Gain agreement to press Zairian officials to halt incendiary rhetoric against Tutsi and stress the need to protect them from reprisals across the

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country. Stress publicly and privately we will not tolerate ethnic cleansing of Tutsi and will hold the GOZ accountable if it occurs (we must not consider specific sanctions before engaging the economic agencies). Lastly, gain agreement to press the Rwandan government to permit humanitarian relief supplies to cross its territory into Zaire, and to avoid attacks on the Mugunga camp.

4. Task Additional Issues

There are a set of additional steps which if implemented might assist in promoting long-term stability in the region and expand our intelligence base in Eastern Zaire. Various agencies should be tasked to analyze each of these five proposals.

Goal: Gain agreement to task out: 1) State/DRL prepare assessment of how offering bounties for those leaders implicated in the genocide could lessen their control over refugees and how such a program could be funded; 2) State/DRL and IO prepare analysis of how Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal could use additional resources and where they could come from, and; 3) CIA prepare assessment of the benefits and risks

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

ITEM NOT IN INTERAGENCY ISSUES PAPER

We omitted the following additional from the paper for further study due to its sensitivity. You can decide whether or not to raise.

[Redacted]

Concurrences by: Eric Schwartz, Richard Clarke/Rand Beers (info)

- Attachments
- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Issue Paper
- Tab C Recent Developments

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